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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
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INC., ) 
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-------------------------) 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
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District Court - Bannock Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0002757-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. 
Date 
6/30/2010 
7/22/2010 
8/10/2010 
8/20/2010 
8/23/2010 
9/3/2010 
9/30/2010 
10/1/2010 
10/13/2010 
Code 
LOCT 
NCOC 
COMP 
SMIS 
ATIR 
ATTR 
ATTR 
ORDR 
OR DR 
HRSC 
HRSC 
User 
MEGAN 
MEGAN 
MEGAN 
MEGAN 
MEGAN 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
MEGAN 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
clerks office 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
Summons Issued 
Judge 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not Stephen S Dunn 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Cooper & Larsen Receipt 
number: 0023393 Dated: 6/30/2010 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: 
Plaintiff: Mickelsen Construction, Inc. Attorney 
Retained Gary L Cooper 
Return of service - srvd on Lesa Horrocks on 
7-13-2010 (summons and complaint) 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Return of service - srvd on Sunshine Secretarial Stephen S Dunn 
Services, thru Lesa Horrocks on 7-13-2010 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Stephen S Dunn 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Maguire & 
Penrod Receipt number: 0026797 Dated: 
7/30/2010 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: 
Horrocks, Lesa Darlene (defendant) and 
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. (defendant) 
Defendant: Horrocks, Lesa Darlene Attorney 
Retained David K. Penrod 
Defendant: Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. 
Attorney Retained David K. Penrod 
Order for Submission of Information for 
Scheduling Order /s J Dunn 08/06/10 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Notice of Service - discovery to Defs: aty Gary Stephen S Dunn 
Cooper for plntf 
Response to Order for Submission of Information Stephen S Dunn 
for Scheduling Order; aty Gary Cooper for plntf 
Order setting Jury Trial /s J Dunn 09/02/10 Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/12/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/17/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn 
AM) 
Notice of Substitution of counsel; aty David Stephen S Dunn 
Penrod 
Notice of Substitution of counsel; aty David Stephen S Dunn 
Penrog 
Notice of service - Response to Plaintiffs request Stephen S Dunn 
for Admissions: aty aaron Thompson 
Notice of service - Response to Plntfs discovery Stephen S Dunn 
to Defendant: aty Aaron Thompson 
Date: 5/27/2011 
Time: 09:52 AM 
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Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. 
Date 
10/18/2010 
10/19/2010 
10/27/2010 
10/29/2010 
11/2/2010 
11/19/2010 
11/22/2010 
12/2/2010 
12/6/2010 
1/14/2011 
1/18/2011 
1/24/2011 
2/2/2011 
Code 
HRSC 
ORDR 
DCHH 
HRSC 
HRVC 
HRVC 
User 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
KARLA 
KARLA 
Judge 
Motion to extend scheduling order RE: Deadline Stephen S Dunn 
to add new parties or amend the pleadings; 
aty Aaron Thompson 
Motion to extend scheduling order re: Deadline to Stephen S Dunn 
add new parties or Amend the pleadings; aty 
Aaron Thompson 
notice of hearing; set for Defs Motion on Stephen S Dunn 
11-15-2010 @2pm: aty Aaron Thompson 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment: aty Stephen S Dunn 
Aaron Thompson 
Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks in support of Stephen S Dunn 
Defs Motion for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron 
Thompson 
Affidavit of Alan Smith in support of Defs Motion Stephen S Dunn 
for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron Thompson 
Affidavit of Brent L Grigg in Support of Defs Stephen S Dunn 
Motion for Summary Judgment; aty Aaron 
Thompson 
Memorandum in support of Defs Motion for Stephen S Dunn 
Summary Judgment: aty Aaron Thompson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/15/201002:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Order to extned deadling to add new parties to Stephen S Dunn 
11/30/10 /s J Dunn 11/19/10 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/15/2010 Stephen S Dunn 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 
Notice of hearing of Defendants Motion for Stephen S Dunn 
summary Judgment: aty Aaron Thompson 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/31/2011 03:00 Stephen S Dunn 
PM) 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in opposition to motion for Stephen S Dunn 
summary judgment; aty Gary Cooper for plntf 
Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen; aty Gary Cooper Stephen S Dunn 
for plntf 
Affidavit of Justin Hokanson; aty Gary Cooper 
Defendants Reply Brief to Plntfs Memorandum 
and Opposition to motion for summary judgment; 
aty Aaron Thompson 
Stephen S Dunn 
Stephen S Dunn 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/17/2011 Stephen S Dunn 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/12/2011 Stephen S Dunn 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Date: 5/27/2011 
Time: 09:52 AM 
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Date 
2/2/2011 
2/1612011 
3/712011 
3/8/2011 
3/9/2011 
3/17/2011 
3/23/2011 
3/24/2011 
Code 
DCHH 
JDMT 
CSTS 
APSC 
NOTC 
MISC 
HRSC 
CSTS 
MISC 
MISC 
MISC 
User 
KARLA 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
DCANO 
CAMILLE 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
CAMILLE 
DCANO 
DCANO 
DCANO 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/31/2011 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Sheila Fish 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Judge 
Stephen S Dunn 
Memorandum Decision and order on motion for Stephen S Dunn 
summary judgment; 
Judgment; Judgment be entered in this mater Stephen S Dunn 
in favor af said defs and against the plntf 
Mickelsen cons. Inc and this case is hereby 
DISMISSED: sl Judge Dunn 2-2-2011 
Case Status Changed: Closed Stephen S Dunn 
Affidavit of Aaron Thompson RE: Fees and Costs; Stephen S Dunn 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn 
Supreme Court Paid by: Cooper & Larsen, 
Chartered Receipt number: 0008015 Dated: 
3/7/2011 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. (plaintiff) 
Objection to defendants Memorandum for Stephen S Dunn 
attorneys fees and costs; aty Gary Cooper for 
plntf 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Stephen S Dunn 
NOTICE OF APPEAL; Gary L. Cooper; Attorney Stephen S Dunn 
for Plntfs. 
Check # 27338 for $101.00 received on 3-7-11 Stephen S Dunn 
and Check # 27339 for $100.00 (deposit for 
Clerk's Record) on 3-7-11. 
Notice of hearing; set for 4-11-2011 @ 2pm: aty Stephen S Dunn 
Aaron Thompson 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Stephen S Dunn 
04/11/2011 02:00 PM) Fees and Costs 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Stephen S Dunn 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed Stephen S Dunn 
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on 
3-17-11. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Notice of Appeal Stephen S Dunn 
received in SC on 3-21-11. Docket Number 
38634-2011. Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcripts must be filed in SC on 5-25-11 
(4-20-11 5 weeks prior) The following Transcripts 
shall be Lodged: Motin for Summary Judgment 
held 1-31-11. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate Stephen S Dunn 
received in SC on 3-21-11. Please examine the 
titlte and contact Dist Court Clerk of any 
corrections. If not any the Title in the Certificate 
must appear on all Documents filed with SC. 
Date: 5/27/2011 
Time: 09:52 AM 
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ROAReport 
Case: CV-2010-0002757-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. vs. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. VS. Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. 
Date Code User 
3/24/2011 MISC DCANO 
3/31/2011 STIP DCANO 
MISC DCANO 
4/412011 MISC DCANO 
4/14/2011 HRSC DCANO 
HRWV DCANO 
4/25/2011 MISC DCANO 
MISC DCANO 
5/912011 DCHH KARLA 
5/11/2011 CAMILLE 
Judge 
CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF Stephen S Dunn 
APPEAL; Signed and Mailed to Counsel and SC. 
Correction: Mickelsen Construction, Inc. in 
heading. 
Stipulation to Continue hearing schedule for Stephen S Dunn 
4-11-11. Reasoning for said Stipulation is that Mr. 
Thompson has another hearing in Bear Lake 
County. 
Amended Notice of Hearing; Aaron N. Thompson, Stephen S Dunn 
Attorney for Defendants. 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Certificate of Stephen S Dunn 
Appeal received in SC on 3-28-11. Please 
carefully examine the Title if any corrections notify 
Dist. Clerk. The Title in the Cert. must appear on 
all documents filed in SC. 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Stephen S Dunn 
05/0212011 02:00 PM) Hearing for Defendant 
Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial's 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Stephen S Dunn 
04/11/2011 02:00 PM: Hearing Waived Fees 
and Costs 
NOTICE OF LODGING from Sheial T. Fish on Stephen S Dunn 
4-25-11. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT RECEIVED IN Stephen S Dunn 
COURT RECORDS FROM Sheila Fish on 
4-25-11 for Summary Judgment Motion held 
1-31-11. 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Stephen S Dunn 
05/02/2011 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less 100 
Hearing for Defendant Horrocks and Sunshine 
Secretarial's Memorandum of Fees and Costs 
Judgment for attorneys fees; Defs shall have a Stephen S Dunn 
judgment ag Plaintf in the amount of $2,802.50 as 
of 5-2-2011: sl Judge Dunn 5-9-2011 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar #1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsel/or Plaintiff 
'~'l ~J : ___ __ 
OEP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
CASE NO. CAf-IO-'(1757-DC 
COMPLAINT 
Pr 4co~ ~. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff and for a cause of action against the Defendants, states and 
alleges as follows: 
I. 
Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction, Inc. is an Idaho corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Idaho. 
II. 
Defendant Lesa Darlene Horrocks is an individual residing in Pocatello, Bannock County, 
Idaho. 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 1 
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II. 
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. is an Idaho corporation organized under the laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
IV. 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. threatened to file a material lien against a project in which 
Accelerated Paving, Inc. was involved. 
V. 
Alan Smith of Accelerated Paving, Inc. came to Delwyn Mickelsen and requested that 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. not file the lien because that would prevent Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
from getting paid on the project. Alan Smith offered to pay by credit card but explained that he 
would have to use the project payment to pay the balance on his credit card before he could obtain 
the credit necessary to fund the credit card payment. 
VI. 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. agreed not to file the lien on the condition that Alan Smith and 
Accelerated Paving, Inc. obtain someone to guarantee the payment by credit card which was offered 
by Alan Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc .. 
VII. 
Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan Smith and 
Accelerated Paying, Inc. and to do so wrote a check on the account of Sunshine Secretarial Services, 
Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks in the amount of $34,980.00 on January 8,2009. A copy of said check 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 2 
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VIII. 
The check written by Lisa D. Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. 
and Lesa D. Horrocks bounced and despite numerous demands the checking account on which the 
check was written never had sufficient funds for the check. Copies of letters from Idaho Central 
Credit Union dated January 26,2009 and January 27,2009 are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
IX. 
That the sum owed is a liquidated sum and plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 12% 
per annum from and after January 8,2009, and until a Judgment is entered in this matter. 
x. 
This is a matter which pursuant to Idaho Code 12-120, the Plaintiffis entitled to reasonable 
attorney fees for pursing this action. In the event of default a reasonable attorney fee is $2,500.00 
together with Court costs incurred. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. For the sum of $34,980.00 against Lesa D. Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial 
Services, Inc., jointly and severally. 
2. For interest at the rate of 12% per annum from and after January 8, 2009, and until 
a Judgment is entered in this matter. 
3. For a reasonable attorney's fee in the amount of$2,500.00 in the event of default and 
if the matter is contested attorney fees be awarded based on a hourly rate of $200.00 per hour; 
4. For Court costs incurred herein. 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 3 
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') (,+i'-
DATED this c/- day of June, 2010. 
COOPER & LARSEN 
COMPLAINT - PAGE 4 
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January 26, 2009 
Mickelsen Construction 
PO BOX 429 
Blackfoot ID 83221 
RE: Insufficient Funds 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am wliting in regards to check # 9061 drawn on account 66286991 under the name of 
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. The check mentioned above has non-sufficient funds 
as of January 26, 2009. 
Should you have any questions in regards to this matter please feel free to contact me at 
208-478-3300. 
bcarlson(a{icCll. com 
6 
B 
January 27, 2009 
Mickelsen Construction 
PO BOX 429 
Blackfoot ID 8322 I 
RE: Insufficient Funds 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I am wliting in regards to check # 9061 drawn on account 66286991 under the name of 
Sunshine Secretarial Services Inc. The check mentioned above has non-sufficient funds 
as of January 27,2009. 
- Should you have any questions in regards to this matter please feel free to contact me at 
208-478-3300. 
Brittany Carlson 
Assistant Manager 
Blackfoot Store 
bcarl son(a}iccu. com 
7 
DAVID H. MAGUIRE, ISB#2109 
DAVID K. PENROD, ISB#6481 
MAGUIRE & PENROD 
1414 E. Center - P.O. Box 4758 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4758 
Telephone: (208) 232-5167 
FAX: (208) 232-5181 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV 2010-2757-0C 
ANSWER 
COME NOW the Defendants, Lesa Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by 
and through the law firm of Maguire & Penrod, and as their Answer to the Complaint filed by 
Plaintiff respond as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. The Plaintiff s complaint fails to state a claimupon which relief may be granted 
and should be dismissed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. The Defendants deny each and every allegation of the complaint that is not 
8 
specifically and expressly admitted in this answer. The allegations are denied 
based upon Defendants' belief that they are incorrect, false, misconstrue facts or 
upon a lack of sufficient information on the part of Defendants to admit or deny 
the same. 
3. Responding to paragraph I of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack 
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained 
therein and, hereby, deny the same. 
4. The Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraphs II and III of the 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
5. Responding to paragraph IV of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack 
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained 
therein and, hereby, deny the same. 
6. Responding to paragraph V of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack 
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations concerning 
conversations taking place between Alan Smith of Accelerated Paving, Inc. and 
Delwyn Mickelsen contained therein and, hereby, deny the same. Defendants 
admit that Accelerated Paving, Inc. offered to pay a debt to Mickelsen 
Construction by way of credit card transaction once Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
obtained the funds necessary to make the credit card payment. 
7. Responding to paragraph VI of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants lack 
sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations contained 
therein and, hereby, deny the same. 
8. Responding to paragraph VII of the Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants admit 
9 
that a check was drafted in the amount of$34,980.00 on January 8,2009, and that 
a correct copy of said check is attached to the Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit A, 
but Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph VII of the 
Plaintiff s Complaint. Further the Defendants affirmatively assert that at no time 
did they enter into any verbal or written contract to guarantee a payment from 
Alan Smith and/or Accelerated Paving, Inc. to Plaintiff. 
9. Responding to paragraph VIII ofthe Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendants deny 
the allegations contained in paragraph VIII of the Plaintiffs Complaint and 
affirmatively assert that the check referenced in paragraph VII of the Plaintiffs 
Complaint was drafted and conditionally given to the Plaintiff on January 8,2009, 
to be held until confirmation was given by Defendants to Plaintiff that funds were 
available. 
10. The Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs IX and X of the 
Plaintiffs Complaint. 
11. Responding to the prayer for relief contained in the Plaintiffs Complaint, the 
Defendant denies that the Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
12. By raising the following defenses, the Defendants make no admission of any kind 
and do not assume any burden of proof or production not otherwise properly 
resting upon them in this lawsuit. Rather, the Defendants merely identify defenses 
to preserve them for all proper uses under applicable law. The Defendants have 
yet to complete discovery in this case, the result of which may reveal additional 
defenses to the Plaintiff s Complaint. As such, the Defendants reserve the right to 
10 
supplement, modify or delete defenses-after discovery is completed. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. The Plaintiff s claims are barred by the statute of frauds that precludes actions to 
enforce a verbal contract on a promise to answer for the debt, default or 
miscarriage of another. The Defendants did not enter into a verbal or written 
contract to answer for the debts of Accelerated Paving, Inc.; but, even if the 
Defendants did enter into an agreement as alleged, no written contract exists as 
required by the statute of frauds. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. The Plaintiffs claims are barred for lack of consideration. The Defendants did 
not receive any thing of value in exchange for the alleged promise to answer for 
the debt of Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
15. The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrines of estoppel, laches and waiver. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
16. The Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
17. The Defendants claim a lack of privity as Defendants have never entered into any 
contractual or debtor/creditor arrangements with the Plaintiff. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
18. The Plaintiffs damages, if any, were caused by acts both superseding and 
intervening, or acts or omissions of parties and entities other than the Defendants 
over whom the Defendants have no controland-no right to control. 
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
19. The Defendants have been required to retain the services of the law firm of 
Maguire and Penrod to defend this action, and have incurred and will incur costs 
and attorney fees in connection therewith. The Defendants are entitled to recover 
their attorney fees and other costs of defense from the Plaintiff pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray that any relief requested by Plaintiffbe denied, and 
that the Defendants be granted relief as follows: 
1. Dismiss the complaint with prejUdice, and find that the Plaintiff takes nothing 
thereby; 
2. That the Court issue an award for all costs and attorneys fees incurred by the 
Defendants in connection with this matter; and, 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
JURY DEMAND 
The Defendants demand a jury trial for all claims and causes of action stated by this 
answer pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED tUay of July, 2010. 
~ 
DAVID H. MAGUIRE 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was: 
g"mailed, postage prepaid 
D hand delivered 
o Telefax 
to the following, this ZZ--day of July, 2010, and addressed as follows: 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Maguire 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICI}\;Jj:DISfrudif tW'LtHE 
r~ .. !""" • ~'''''. i" [': ... '" ~_ , """ 
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE CO~ 1:'1l;'B~tJC'i 4:; 
Reglster#CV-201O-02757-0C l;, _~" _______ ~ ____ " __ _ 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) ~J~~i" j ;"", '";L<~;';;{ 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and SUNSHINE ) 
SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION 
OF INFORMATION FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
A Complaint was filed in this matter on the 30th day of June, 2010. The Defendant[s] have 
now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue. 
Pursuant to 1.R.c.P. 16, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days of the 
date of this Order: 
A) The parties, through their counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), shall CONFER 
and reach agreement on each of the issues listed below. 
B) After the parties have conferred and reached an agreement on each issue, PLAINTIFF'S 
counsel (or Plaintiff, if self-represented) shall submit to the Court the AGREED RESPONSE to 
each issue listed below. 
C) Issues on which the parties must reach an agreement and submit a response: 
(1) Whether this matter is to be tried to the Court or to a jury. 
(2) Whether service is still needed upon any unserved parties. 
(3) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are expected. 
(4) Whether an unusual amount oftime is needed for trial preparation and/or discovery. 
Case No. CV-2010-02757-0C 
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(5) The number of trial days required for trial. 
(6) Whether there are any other matters the parties agree would be helpful to a determination of 
the case that should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a Scheduling 
Order, and what those matters are. 
(7) TWO (2) TRIAL DATES, that comply with the requirements listed below. The trial 
date for the case will be the earliest date submitted by agreement of the parties. The reason the 
Court asks for two trial dates is so that optional backup trial date is available and calendared in 
the event the first trial date has to be continued by Motion to and Order of the Court. In the 
event an Order continuing the trial setting becomes necessary, the additional trial date avoid the 
need to vacate the trial setting for up to a year. Thus, the parties should plan to try the case on 
the first date submitted. However, do not submit less th~tn two trial dates. 
• The two dates must be AGREED to by the parties and must be the specific day upon 
which the trial will begin. 
• Each date submitted must be a TUESDA Y. [If the Monday of that week is a holiday, the 
date submitted must be a WEDNESDAY]. 
• Do not submit trial dates for the third week of any month as that is the Court's criminal 
trial week. 
• The first agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than nine (9) months and no more 
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order. 
• The second agreed trial date must be a specific day no less than twelve (12) months and no 
more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order. 
• If the parties agree that unusual factors may justify a trial setting schedule which varies in 
any way from the requirements of this Order, the parties may submit those factors in the 
Case No. CV-2010-02757-0C 
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AGREED RESPONSE and the Court will give serious consideration to those factors in 
setting the trial date. But the parties must still submit two agreed trial dates that comply 
with this Order. 
D) Upon receipt of the AGREED RESPONSE the Court will issue a scheduling Order setting the 
matter for trial on the agreed dates with deadlines for discovery, disclosure of witnesses, etc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the AGREED RESPONSE 
Ordered herein, within the fourteen (14) days of the date of this ORDER, the Court will set this 
matter for trial on dates available to the Court and will not approve stipulations to modify the trial 
dates set. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis b~ayof k# ,2010. 
s~--
District Judge 
Case No. CV-2010-027S7-0C 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \l') day of--"' ............. ~~'-=-_---' 2010, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon eac f the following individuals 
in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
Cooper & Larsen 
PO Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
David H. Maguire 
David K. Penrod 
Maguire & Penrod 
PO Box 4758 
Pocatello,ID 83205-4758 
(~U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(.,(U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
DATED this \l2J day of _~!o.A.A..~~:::::--__ ' 2010. 
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,JG-19-2010 16: 50 
Omy L. Cooper. Idaho Stale Bar # J 8) 4 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 Nonb 'Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, 1D 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsellnr Plairtlilf 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAl DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintift~ ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSBlNE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
mc~ ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-027S7-0C 
RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR 
SUBMISSION OF lNFORMAttON FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
COME NOW the parties and pursuant to the Counts Order fol" submission of information 
for scheduling order State as follows: 
(1) Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties. 
RE~PONSE: No. 
(2) Whether motions to add new panies or otherwise amend the pleadings are contemplated. 
RESPONSE: No. 
(3) Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-tri'al motions. 
RESPONSE: Yes. 
(4) Whether the Gase presents any unU$uallime requirements for trial preparation. 
RESPONSE: No. ORIGINALP 
RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR SUBMlSSION OF INF(18MATION FOR SCHEDULJNG ORDER - p,,(;~; I 
.. 1UG-19-2010 16:513 
(5) The agreed amount of time required for trial. 
RESlONSE: 3-4 days. 
(6) Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for discovery. 
RESPONSE: No. 
(7) Whethel' any party requests coun-order mediation. 
RESPONSE! No. 
(8) Three stipulated trial dates, Ont no Jess than she (6) months and no more than nine (9) 
months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than nine (9) months and no more than 
twelve (12) months from the date oftrus Order, and a third no less than twelve (I2) months and no 
more than fifteen (lS) months from the date of this Order. Dates during the third week of each 
month shall be reserved for criminal jmy trial and should not be submitted as possible trial dates. 
RESPONSE: This case cannot be ready for trial within 9 months frOlll the date of the Order; 
July 12-15 2011; and August 2·5,2011. 
(9) Whether there are other mattets conducive to detennination of the action that the panies 
agree should be brought to the attention of the Coun prior to entering a Scheduling Order. 
RESlONSE: No. 
DATED this ~ day of August, 2010. 
COOPER & LARSEN MAGUIRE & PENROD 
RESPONSE TO ORDER FOR SUBMISSION O'F INFORMAT10N FOR SCllEDVLlNG ORDER. PAct 2 
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, C~TERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 56 
~ 
Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and 
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, 
Chartered, hereby move this Court for an order granting Summary Judgment as to all claims 
alleged in Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction Inc.'s Complaint filed on or about June 30, 2010. 
This Motion will be supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks, Brent L. Grigg, and Allen 
Smith. 
WHEREFORE it is respectfully prayed: 
1. That this Court set oral argument and briefing schedule consistent with Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56; 
2. That after said hearing, the Court enter summary judgment in favor of Defendants; 
3. That Court award Defendants their attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 
CASE NO: CV-201O-27S7-0C - DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
LRC.P. RULE 56- PAGE 1 
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and applicable Idaho rules; 
4. Any and ~!U~~~lief as just and equitable. 
DATED thisCL1dJy of October, 2010 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Pursuant to I.R. c.P. Rule 56 was served on the following named persons at the 
addresses shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
+l 
DATED thi~1 day of October, 2010 
[~S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C - DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
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<C ~2tJIUf1 729 Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. Rv PH 4: 36 MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTEREd' 216 West Whitman f Ury"r:--; .,,_ 
P 0 Box 370 v! - ,";,/ ..... ,' • • "" '-t}t, ... ~ ... 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Lesa Darlene does depose and state: 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF LESA DARLENE 
HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. I am one ofthe Defendants in the above captioned action. 
2. I am the partial owner of closely held corporation, Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. 
3. My corporation's physical address is 845 W. Center Street, Suite C, Pocatello, Idaho. 
4. Sunshine is in the business of providing contract secretarial services, professional 
office space rental with in-house services, as well as, accounting and management 
servIces. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
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5. In the course of transacting Sunshine's business, Sunshine maintains and pays for a 
credit card machine in order to accept payment from clients to her various tenants for 
their services rendered. 
6. Sunshine pays a monthly fee, and in exchange for that monthly fee, is capable of 
transacting with American Express credit cards, as well as Discover, Visa and 
MasterCard. 
7. Accelerated Paving, Inc. subleases a common office space in the Sunshine offices in 
Pocatello, Idaho, by paying monthly rent. __ ~" 
8. Sunshine also provides secretarial services, at times, for Accelerated Paving, Inc., and 
other in-house services such as copies, DSL, cleaning, etc. 
9. Sunshine's contacts with Accelerated Paving are Brent Grigg (the general manager of 
Accelerated) and Alan Smith (Accelerated's Vice President). 
10. On or about January 8, 2009, I was approached by Brent and Alan with Accelerated 
Paving and asked if they could use Sunshine's credit card machine to run a $34,980 
transaction, and correspondingly write a check to Mickelsen Construction for the 
same amount, with the understanding that American Express would pay the debt in 
the normal course of business. 
11. It is my understanding that Accelerated Paving, Inc. contacted American Express 
prior to this transaction, explained to AmEx the transaction that Accelerated was 
requesting, and it was my understanding that Accelerated gained approval. 
12. Relying on these representations, Accelerated Paving, Inc., gave Sunshine their 
American Express credit card, and on January 8, 2009, I ran the credit card through 
Sunshine's credit card machine. 
13. Based upon my experience with the machine, and the fact that I run this through my 
normal course of business, I believed that the credit card transaction was approved by 
American Express and the money would be sent through. 
14. After witnessing said approval Sunshine I executed a check on January 8, 2009 
(check No. 9061), to the order of Mickelsen Construction in the amount of $34,980 
for him to hold until the funds came to my bank. 
15. There were no other writings, memorandums, or documents regarding this 
transaction. 
CASE NO: CV -2010-2757 -OC -AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
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16. The sole purpose of Sunshine writing this check, and runmng the credit card 
transaction, was to facilitate a transaction between Accelerated Paving, Inc. and 
Mickelsen Construction. 
17. I received absolutely no financial benefit from this transaction, at the time this was 
processed, or at any time thereafter. 
18. I never told anyone in writing, or verbally, that Sunshine was willing to accept this 
debt on Accelerated's behalf at the time that transaction had occurred, or at any time 
afterwards. 
19. Several days later, I was informed by Accelerated Paving, Inc. that American Express 
was not going to approve the transaction. 
20. Immediately corresponding with this conversation with Accelerated Paving, 
Mickelsen Construction was contacted, and informed of what had occurred, and not 
to cash the check. 
21. Mr. Mickelsen admitted to me that check had not yet been cashed. 
22. It is my understanding that Accelerated Paving, Inc. filed bankruptcy. 
23. I was sued by Mickelsen Construction, in this case, shortly thereafter. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED thi~ay of October, 2010 ---------'---____ .~ 
/ 
i 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, Notary, this d11D day of October, 2010 
CFORIDAHO 
Residi~g ~t:\fffl~b~ 
CommlsslOn'itx'Plres: 0\ (llf/Bo1i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the 
addresses shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
~ 
DATED thiS'l! day of October, 2010 
[YJJ U.S. Mail l j Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Alan Smith does depose and state: 
1. I am Alan Smith, and I am the vice president of Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
2. Accelerated Paving, Inc. (hereinafter "Accelerated") is a corporation authorized to do 
business in the State of Idaho. 
3. Accelerated is physically located at 45 West Center, Suite C-IO, Pocatello, Idaho 
83204. 
4. Prior to January 9, 2009, Accelerated had a contractual relationship with Mickelsen 
Construction in which Mickelsen provided services at an Accelerated job site. 
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5. Accelerated owed Mickelsen $34, 980.00 for services rendered associated with the 
debt referenced in Paragraph 4 ofthis Affidavit. 
6. During the first week of January, 2009, Acc~lerated's General Manager Brent Grigg, 
and myself, conversed as to how to pay the above referenced debt because Mickelsen 
was understandably becoming impatient about receiving the due funds. 
7. Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's lien against the real property to secure 
his funds. 
8. Accelerated knew that if Mickelsen filed the lien, we would be delayed in receiving 
payment from our job. We wanted to avoid the lien at all costs. 
9. We contacted American Express to see if we could facilitate a charge to our 
American Express Business Credit Card account to pay Mickelsen an amount of 
$34,980.00. 
10. We received confirmation that we had the available credit, and that we could pay 
Mickelsen with this card. 
11. We immediately started making arrangements to run this American Express 
transaction to pay Mickelsen, particularly to avoid Mickelsen from filing a lien (as he 
had a right to do). 
12. On January 8, 2009, Delwynn Mickelsen of Mickelsen Construction came to 
Accelerated Paving'S office and inquired as to the payment due. 
13. We told Mr. Mickelsen that we would be able to pay him on January 9, 2010, based 
on our conversation with American Express and that we had sufficient credit with 
American Express to pay off this outstanding debt. 
14. Mr. Mickelsen indicated that he could not accept an American Express payment as 
his business did not accept that particular credit card. 
15. I also asked him to see ifhis bank would accept the transaction by running our card, 
they declined. 
16. At that point, we spoke with Lesa Horrocks of Sunshine Secretarial Services, our 
landlord, and spoke with her about her business, Sunshine, facilitating an American 
Express credit card transaction. 
17. We told Sunshine that we had pre-approval from American Express, that we had 
sufficient credit to pay this debt, and that all she had to do was swipe the card. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C -AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN SMITH IN S~RT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
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18. Sunshine ran the credit card through, based on our representations. 
19. Mr. Mickelsen agreed and had full knowledge of this transaction, but he did ask for 
Sunshine to write a check that he would hold until monies were received. 
20. On reliance from American Express, and our representations Sunshine wrote a check 
in the amount of$34,980.00. 
21. In mid-January, 2009, I received a letter dated January 14, 2009, from American 
Express. 
22. This letter carne directly from American Express, and this was regarding 
Accelerated's business platinum card. 
23. This is the typical way I receive correspondence from American Express regarding 
Accelerated's American Express Business Credit Card. 
24. Accelerated keeps these types of letters in the course and conduct of its regularly 
conducted business activity, i.e. conducting business charges and know the financial 
status of the credit account. 
25. I have attached a copy of this January 14, 2009 letter and the letter is incorporated 
herein as Exhibit "A". 
26. I immediately contacted Mickelsen and told him that the transaction, wrongfully, did 
not go through. 
27. I asked him not to cash Sunshine's check, because Sunshine would not likely have 
sufficient funds to support the check, due to American Express's failure. 
28. I strongly disagreed with American Express's position on closing our account, 
partiCUlarly given we had prior approval to run this transaction before we did it. 
29. Had I known, prior to January 9, 2009, that American Express would not have 
honored our credit with them (the transaction); we would have never attempted 
running the credit card transaction, or involving Sunshine Secretarial. 
30. On Wednesday, January 14, 2009, I approximately 2:30 p.m., I sent an e-mail to 
Michelle Malone at American Express. 
31. I have attached a true and correct copy of this e-mail to this Affidavit as Exhibit "B". 
32. This e-mail lines out, contemporaneous with the problem, that we had American 
Express. 
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33. There were no other writings; written agreements, or memoralization regarding this 
transaction BETWEEN MICKELSEN AND ACCELERATED. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED this61 day of October, 2010 
J..>-"~L-_ day of October, 2010 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Alan Smith Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the addresses 
shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED thi~ of October, 2010 
t!J U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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Brent G 
from; 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
SLlbJect; 
Attachments: 
January 14, 2009 
American Express 
Michelle Malone 
Fax number (800) 219-2549 
Dear Michelle, 
'-A",'"u .. ves,Ul[E!SC(m~Ol.com 
WIl,rln~l!!tltj~1I January 14, 2009 2:13 PM 
This letter is in regards to our !3,.""lInT number 372720216481005. 
Recently you closed our account an unknown reason. Upon speaking with a representative from American Express 
last week, we made a to a vendor and had approval from Amex on our account for a total of $34,890.00. In 
turn, the company collecting this for that vendor wrote a check for the entire balance of $34,890.00, relying on the 
confirmation that we would be a to pay them that amount of money when we paid off our balance with you. (See 
ettached copy of check). We on having these funds available and it has put us in a hardship with our 
vendors. The documentation we in the first fax reflects not a payment but What was going to be charged to our 
American Express account since approval was given on January 8,2009. You may look through our transactions on 
the card ana not find any other for $34,890.00. 
We have been a cardholder since and count on American Express for daily transactions. We have always paid our 
bill and have had a great r",I~ltit'\I"\liO!hl ... with you. Closing our account will, and has put our company in an extreme 
hardship. Again. we paid our in full and had an agreement with you for a $34,890.00 transaction and it has been 
declined. I strongly request you re-consider reopening our account at the same balance or larger so that we may meet 
our obligation to our ve~dor and re businesses? 
We are looking forward to a great this year, we have just been awarded over $800,000.00 in contracts and need all 
the help we can get to fund these nrn"GlrfCl one is an Air Force contract in Las Vegas and the other one is for a 
Municipality in Utah. 
Please contact me on my cell 
Thank you, 
Alan Smith 
208-221-9020 
immediately so we can discuss the options available 
A Good Credit Score is 700 or HUI.,.ru. See yours in lust 2 easy stepsr 
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRENT L. GRIGG IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Brent L. Grigg does depose and state: 
1. My name is Brent L. Grigg, and I am the general manager of Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
2. Accelerated Paving, Inc. (hereinafter "Accelerated") is, and at all times relevant to 
this lawsuit, a corporation authorized to do business in the State of Idaho. 
3. Accelerated is located at 845 W. Center, Suite C-10, Pocatello, Idaho 83204. 
4. At a time prior to January 1, 2009, Mickelsen Construction entered into a contractual 
agreement with Accelerated to provide asphalt for an Accelerated worksite. 
5. Accelerated agreed to pay Mickelsen $34,980.00 for services rendered. 
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6. In order to pay this outstanding debt, Accelerated contacted Delwynn Mickelsen, of 
Mickelsen Construction, who is believed by Accelerated to be an agent of Mickelsen 
Construction. 
7. Accelerated asked Mickelsen if it could pay the outstanding debt (referenced 111 
Paragraph 5 of this Affidavit) with an American Express credit card. 
8. Mr. Mickelsen agreed to accept this payment, but indicated that Mickelsen 
Construction did not have the business means of accepting an American Express 
credit card. 
9. I, on behalf of Accelerated, contacted Lesa Horrocks with Sunshine Secretarial, Inc. 
to see ifher business could facilitate an American Express credit card transaction. 
10. I knew from my previous professional experiences with Sunshine that Sunshine 
accepted American Express cards. 
11. I contacted Sunshine and asked if Sunshine would be willing to facilitate a payment 
to Mickelsen Construction, from Accelerated, by use of Accelerated's American 
Express business credit card. 
12. Our plan was that Sunshine would run the Accelerated American Express card, gain 
approval for said transaction , and Sunshine would write Mickelsen a check for the 
total amount when the money came in, however, Mickelsen wanted a post-dated 
check that day. 
13. It was understood that Sunshine would be reimbursed the total amount of the 
transaction from American Express when the transaction cleared. 
14. Mickelsen was present for many discussions regarding this potential transaction, 
including the day that the card was ran, and wasin-agreement with it. 
15. In anticipation of this, Accelerated contacted American Express before running this 
transaction through Sunshine's credit card machine, and gained confirmation from 
an American Express agent that American Express would honor this facilitated 
transaction. 
16. After gaining pre-approval from American Express, I physically gave the Accelerated 
American Express Business card for Sunshine to swipe through its credit card 
machine. 
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~i .. · 
17. I personally observed Lesa Horrocks, on behalf of Sunshine, draft a check to 
Delwynn Mickelsen to cover the transaction when the money came in. 
18. Mr. Mickelsen understood the transaction as he was present for all of the discussions, 
including that day. 
19. Sunshine was not going to receive any financial benefit for running this transaction, 
nor did it in any fashion. 
20. There was absolutely no agreement between Accelerated Paving and Sunshine, or 
Lesa Horrocks, for Sunshine/Horrocks to assume Accelerated Paving's debt to Mr. 
Mickelsen in any fashion. 
21. Mickelsen required that Sunshine give him a check in the amount of $34,980.00 to 
cash, once the funds from American Express were received. 
22. Mickelsen understood that he was not supposed to cash the check until he received 
confirmation that the transaction was consummated and Sunshine had received the 
funds. 
23. Mickelsen did not cash the check, nor did he attempt to, for several weeks after 
January 9,2009. 
24. On or about January 14, 2009, we received a letter from American Express indicating 
that our American Express card had been cancelled. 
25. Immediately, I contacted Mr. Mickelsen to inform him not to cash the check, as I 
realized the agreement would not be honored by American Express. 
26. He admitted to me that he had not yet cashed the check, which was consistent with 
the agreement we had made on January 9,2009. 
27. Due to other unforeseen circumstances, Accelerated Paving was forced to file 
bankruptcy on March 6,2009. 
28. Mickelsen Construction was included as a creditor in the bankruptcy filing, and this 
is the exact same debt ($34,980.00) that is involved in this case. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
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DATED this )1 day of October, 2010 
~ 
SUBSCRIDED AND SWORN to before me, Notary this 1-day of October, 2010 
\\' , -".,/ ~''\\'~~~\I1t\'i i:; ~f~//1~4 
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NOT IC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: \'oc.ok\\o pp 
Commission Expires: ell t~ I d.<>lt:j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following named persons at the addresses 
shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED thi~OfOctober, 2010 
H11.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 56 
Defendants Lesa Darlene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and 
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, 
Chartered, respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Statement of Facts that follow derive from the Affidavits filed 
contemporaneousl y herewith and the pleadings filed by both Parties. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. (hereinafter "Sunshine") is a closely held 
corporation, owned primarily by Lesa Darlene Horrocks (hereinafter "Lesa"). Sunshine is 
located at 845 W Center St # C, Pocatello, Idaho, and Lesa;s-its sole employee. Sunshine is in 
the business of providing contract secretarial services, professional office space rental with in-
house services, as well as accounting and management services, in Pocatello, Idaho. 
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Accelerated Paving, Inc, (hereinafter "Accelerated") is a corporation that provides paving 
services in Pocatello, Idaho, and Southeast Idaho. Accelerated subleases a common office space 
with Sunshine. Sunshine also provided secretarial services, at times, for Accelerated and other 
in-house services such as copies, DSL, cleaning, etc. 
Some time prior to January 8, 2009, Mickelsen- Construction, Inc (hereinafter 
"Mickelsen") subcontracted with Accelerated. The negotiated cost of the services due to 
Mickelsen was $34,980. Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's lien against the real 
property of Accelerated's project. To avoid this lien, Accelerated and Mickelsen entered an 
agreement that Accelerated would immediately pay Mickelsen the outstanding debt with an 
American Express credit card. 
Mickelsen could not accept American Express credit cards through its business. As a 
result, Accelerated approached Sunshine, of which has a credit card transaction machine, and 
asked if Sunshine could facilitate the transaction. As a benefit to one of her tenants, Sunshine 
agreed to facilitate the transaction. Mickelsen accepted this arrangement and agreed not to file a 
materialmen's lien against the real property. 
Mickelsen insisted that Sunshine draft a check in the amount of $34,980. It was agreed 
that after American Express rendered payment, Mickelsen would be notified and he could then 
cash the check. Accelerated would immediately run the American Express credit card for the 
total amount. 
Accelerated contacted American Express to make certain that this transaction would be 
approved. Accelerated received verbal confirmation directly from American Express. Sunshine, 
relying to its detriment, on American Express and Accelerated, wrote the check to Mickelsen. 
There is no writing signed by any of the Parties memorializing that Sunshine personally 
guaranteed the debt, or assumed the debt. It was understood by all Parties that Sunshine was 
simply facilitating the transaction because Mickelsen did not accept American Express. 
Sunshine did not stand to gain, financially, in any fashion from this transaction. 
Mter the check was written, and presented to Mickelsen about a week later, American 
Express contacted Accelerated by letter and indicated that it would no longer honor the 
transaction. Therefore, the funds would not be paid to Sunshine from American Express. 
Mickelsen was contacted by Accelerated to inform that the check should not be cashed and for 
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discussion about other alternatives to paying this debt. Accelerated filed for bankruptcy on or 
about March 6,2009, for reasons other than this transaction. 
II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGl\1ENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden of 
establishing absence of a genuine issue of material facts rest at all times with the party moving 
for summary judgment. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960,963 (1994). When 
an action will be tried before the Court without a jury, resolution of the possible conflict between 
inferences is within the responsibilities of the trial court as fact finder. Cameron v. Neal, 130 
Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). The trial judge is not constrained to draw 
inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for suriiniaryjudgment, but rather the judge is 
free to arrive at the most probable inference to be drawn from on contraverted evidentiary facts, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Intermountain Forest Management, 136 Idaho 
233,235,31 P.3d 1921, 1923 (2001). (see also Lumos v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437,807 
P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991)). Disputed facts should be construed in favor of the non-moving party 
and all reasonable inference that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in the favor of the 
non-moving party. Lockheed Martin Corp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 134 P.3d 641, 644, 
142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006). 
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A writing is required to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Idaho Code § 9-505, which is the Idaho 
recitation of the Statute of Frauds, requires certain categories of agreements to be in writing.I.C. 
§ 9-505. The statute states, in relevant part: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note of 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his 
agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the 
writing or secondary evidence of its contents: ... 2. A special promise to answer 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except in the cases provided for in 
§ 9-506, Idaho Code ... 
Idaho Code § 9-505(2). 
The exceptions to the writing requirements referenced in l. C. § 9-506 are inapplicable to 
this case. 
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Here, there is no question that the contract asserted by Mickelsen is covered by Idaho 
Code § 9-505(2). There is an absolute requirement for a writing or memorandum for a personal 
guarantee contract. Here, there is no written memorandum, agreement, or contract, executed by 
the Parties, that proves or shows that Sunshine, or Lesa, agreed to assure Accelerated's debt to 
Mickelsen. In order for Mickelsen to enforce this obligation, as to Lesa and Sunshine, there 
must be a writing that memorializes the agreement. 
This debt is, and continues to be, between Accelerated and Mickelsen. There are no facts 
that support the argument that Lesa and/or Sunshine agreed to relieve Accelerated of its 
obligation to Mickelsen. Sunshine was nothing more than a facilitator to allow Accelerated to 
pay its' obligation to Mickelsen by the use of its' American Express credit card machine. 
The check written does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Mickelsen may assert that the 
January 8, 2009 check written from Sunshine to Mickelsen in the amount of $34,9801 satisfies 
the Statute of Frauds requirement. However, in a similar case, Hemingway v. Gruner, 106 Idaho 
422, 679 P.2d 1140 (1984), the Idaho Supreme Court found that a check alone is insufficient to 
constitute a memorialization of an agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
In Hemingway, the parties had an oral contract for the sale of real property coupled with a 
$7,500 check representative of earnest money. Id at 423. A warranty deed was executed in 
consummation of the sale of real property. Id at 423-424. The transaction then fell through. Id. 
This transaction fit within the ambit of Idaho Code § 9-505 requiring a writing.2 The 
district court found the various writings in the case were insufficient to comply with the Statue of 
Frauds. Id at 424. The court stated "[f]ailure to comply with the Statute of Frauds renders an 
oral agreement unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for 
specific performance." (citing Hoffman v. Sv. Co., 102 Idaho 187, 190, 628 P.2d 218, 221 
(1981». "Hoffman required that both parties to a bilateral contract sign the memorandum 
evidencing that agreement, and further that if there is a memorandum signed by both, and 
another unsigned memorandum supplying some of the essential terms of the entire agreement in 
express reference to the unsigned memorandum must be found in the signed memorandum ... " 
Id. (citing Hoffman, 102 Idaho at 190). 
I Exhibit "A" to Mickelsen's Complaint. 
2 A purchase of real estate is required to be in writing pursuant to the Statute of Frauds. 
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The court also went on to find, " ... a $5,000 check standing alone was insufficient 
compliance where it did not contain the essential agreements of the oral agreement." Id at 425. 
As previously stated, Mickelsen contends that Sunshine and Lesa assumed Accelerated's 
debt to Mickelsen. Factually, Sunshine and Lesa do not agree with this contention. However, 
assuming arguendo, that this is true, the agreement must be in writing in order for Mickelsen to 
enforce it. The check is insufficient to comply with the Statute of Frauds. As a matter of law, 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and this claim must be dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
According to Mickelsen's Complaint, there is one legal claim being asserted against 
Sunshine and Lesa. Mickelsen asserts that there is a-personal guarantee contract between 
Mickelsen and SunshinelLesa. Legally, this claim cannot withstand summary judgment muster. 
The agreement must be in writing, must comply with the Statute of Frauds, and the check written 
by SunshinelLesa is insufficient. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Mickelsen's claim against 
SunshinelLesa fails, and must be dismissed. 
DATED th;;ij day of October, 2010 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to l.R. c.P. Rule 56 was served on the following named 
persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED thi~ay of October, 2010 
[~S.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
CASE NO: CV -2010-2757-0C - MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO LR.C.P. RULE 56- PAGE 6 
40 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
COOPER & ~ARSEN, CHARTEREDZI~i1 I\~'! 
151 North ThIrd Avenue, Second Floor"! ... , 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsel/or Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Accelerated Paving, Inc. was indebted to Mickelson Construction for materials supplied on 
a project. When Mickelson Construction threatened to lien the job, Accelerated Paving offered to 
pay with a credit card. Mickelson Construction would only accept a credit card if a third party gave 
a check to cover what was owed. Lesa Horrocks wrote a check on an account bearing the name Lesa 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial Services believing that American Express had approved the 
transaction and would fund the credit card transaction to her account. The check is a sufficient 
writing to satisfy the statute of frauds. However, if it is not then this is an original obligation of 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial which does not need to comply with the Statute of Frauds. 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Accelerated Paving owed Mickelson Construction $34,980 for materials it provided to 
Accelerated Paving on a project. 
2. Accelerated Paving did not pay as agreed. 
3. Mickelson Construction threatened to lien the project. 
4. Accelerated Paving offered payment by credit card. 
5. Mickelson Construction refused to accept the credit card payment unless a third party 
guaranteed payment with a check made payable for the $34,980. 
6. Lesa Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial provided a check for $34,980 and ran the credit card 
transaction for Accelerated Paving. 
7. When the credit card transaction was not funded Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial refused to 
fund the check and it bounced. 
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF LA W 
1. IF L C. §9-505(2) APPLIES THE CHECK IS SUFFICIENT WRITING 
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides as follows with respect to agreements whereby one party 
guarantees the debt of another: 
§ 9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing. - In the following cases the 
agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in 
writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of 
the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except in the 
cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code. 
Mickelson Construction, Inc. has alleged in its Complaint that Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to 
guarantee the debt of Accelerated Paving in the amount of $34,980. Accelerated Paving owed 
Mickelson Construction $34,980 for materials it had supplied to Accelerated Paving on a project and,('~i 
-1.~<1. 
r"",ji 
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Mickelson Construction was about to file a lien on the project. Accelerated Paving through Alan 
Smith wanted to pay Mickelson Construction with a credit card but did not have sufficient credit to 
immediately consummate the transaction. Accelerated Paving needed to be paid on the project so 
it could pay down its credit card balance before running the credit card for payment of the money 
owed to Accelerated Paving. Mickelson Construction was willing to allow Accelerated to do this 
but wanted a check from a third party to guarantee the credit card payment. Lesa Horrocks of 
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. provided the check in the amount of $34,980 to Mickelson 
Construction. 
Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial, in their Motion for Summary Judgment, claim the check 
is not sufficient evidence ofthe "agreement" "or some note or memorandum thereof' to satisfy the 
requirements of §I. C.9-S0S. The check is a sufficient writing. It is signed by Lesa Horrocks; is 
made payable to Mickelson Construction; is for $34,980; and identifies that it is "For Accel." which 
is sufficient to identify Accelerated Paving. §I. C.9-S0S only requires some "note or memorandum" 
of the agreement to be in writing and "subscribed the party to be charged." The check most certainly 
qualifies as a "note or memorandum" of the agreement and it was signed or "subscribed"\ by Lesa 
Horrocks. 
Defendants' reliance on Hoffman v. S V Co., 102 Idaho 187, 188 (Idaho 1981) is misplaced. 
Hoffman dealt with the purchase and sale of a 1.64 acre undeveloped lot. The "check standing 
alone" did not contain the terms of the agreement to purchase the lot because the only notation 
\ Generally, the signature required by the statute of frauds may be any symbol made or 
adopted by a party, with an actual or apparent intent to authenticate the writing and give it force 
and effect. [citations omitted] The traditional form of signature is, of course, the handwritten 
name of the signer. But initials or any symbol may also be used; and the signature may be written 
in pencil, typed, printed, made with a rubber stamp or impressed into the paper. George W 
Watkins Family v. Messenger, lIS Idaho 386, 389 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) 
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carried on that check is the phrase "Escrow Ruud Mtn. Lots." This case does not involve the 
purchase and sale of real property with numerous component parts. It involves Lesa Horrocks 
promise to guarantee the debt of Accelerated Paving to Mickelson Construction. The check is a 
sufficient note or memorandum of the transaction and complies with the Statute of Frauds. 
2. BASED ON THE AFFIDAVIT OF LESA HORROCKS THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY 
In her Affidavit, Lesa Horrocks states that she relied on Accelerated Paving's representation 
that American Express had approved the credit card transaction; she ran Accelerated Paving's credit 
card through her machine; she believed the money would come to her account; and she gave 
Mickelson Construction a check believing American Express would be paying the money into the 
account on which the check was drawn. Her Affidavit confirms that the obligation to pay Mickelson 
Construction $34,980 is an original obligation ofHorrocks/Sunshine Secretarial. I. C. §9-505(2) 
does not apply to cases covered by I. C. §9-506: 
§ 9-506. Original obligations -- Writing not needed. - A promise to answer for the 
obligation of another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation 
of the promisor, and need not be in writing: 
1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of another 
upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received 
a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise. 
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in 
consideration of the obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or 
under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise the principal 
debtor, and the person in whose behalf it is made, his surety. 
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made 
upon the consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation, 
accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the 
party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from 
imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent 
obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from 
either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person. 
4. Where a factor undertakes, for a commission, to sell merchandise and 
guarantee the sale. 
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5. Where the holder ofan instrument for the payment of money, upon which 
a third person is, or may become, liable to him, transfers it in payment of a precedent 
debt of his own, or for a new consideration and in connection with such transfer, 
enters into a promise respecting such instrument. 
Idaho Code § 9-506 
1. C. 9-506(1) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial. Defendants received the credit card transaction from Accelerated and promised to apply 
it to the debt to Mickelson Construction. That is an original promise and it need not be in writing. 
1. C. 9-506(2) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial. Mickelson Construction parted with value, namely agreed not to lien the project of 
Accelerated and Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial agreed to facilitate the transaction thereby making 
Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial the primary debtor. 
1. C. 9-506(3) applies here and makes this an original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial. Mickelson Construction released Accelerated Paving from his right to lien the project 
and accepted Horrocks/Sunshine Secretarial's check. 
1. C. 9-506 makes the transaction here the original obligation of Horrocks/Sunshine 
Secretarial and it need not satisfy the requirements of 1. C. 9-505. 
CONCLUSION 
The check is sufficient to comply with the requirements ofl. C. 9-505, but should this Court 
determine otherwise then the provisions ofl. C. 9-506 makes this transaction the original obligation 
of Horrocks/Sunshine which need not comply with the requirements of 1. C. 9-505. Accordingly, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
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~ 
DATED this ~ day of January, 2011. 
COOPER & LARSEN 
G L. COOPER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~. 
I hereby certify that on the \ '-\ day of January, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to: 
Aaron N. Thompson 
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered 
216 W Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[~s.mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 234-2961 
[~.mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 236-7012 
G~COOPER 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - PAGE 6 
46 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar#1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED ?ffr 
151 North Third Avenue, Second FIOO. ~t' f ! ;;/I! I; 
P.O. Box 4229 c, • 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 c, 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 Df/::JJt,;-.-, 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 I . 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
-.' (~. "-. 
"--'" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DELWYN MICKELSEN 
DELWYN MICKELSEN, being fIrst duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the President of Mickelsen Construction, Inc. and make this affidavit of my own 
personal knowledge and information. 
2. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. threatened to fIle a material lien against a project in 
which Accelerated Paving, Inc. was involved. 
3. Alan Smith of Accelerated Paving, Inc. came to Delwyn Mickelsen and requested that 
Mickelsen Construction, Inc. not fIle the lien because that would prevent Accelerated Paving, Inc. 
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from getting paid on the project. Alan Smith offered to pay by credit card but explained that he 
would have to use the project payment to pay the balance on his credit card before he could obtain 
the credit necessary to fund the credit card payment. 
4. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. agreed not to file the lien on the condition that Alan 
Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc. obtain someone to guarantee the payment by credit card which 
was offered by Alan Smith and Accelerated Paving, Inc .. 
5. Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan 
Smith and Accelerated Paying, Inc. and to do so wrote a check on the account of Sunshine 
Secretarial Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks in the amount of $34,980.00 on January 8, 2009. 
A copy of said check is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A". 
6. The check written by Lisa D. Horrocks on the account of Sunshine Secretarial 
Services, Inc. and Lesa D. Horrocks bounced and despite numerous demands the checking account 
on which the check was written never had sufficient funds for the check. Copies of letters from 
Idaho Central Credit Union dated January 26, 2009 and January 27, 2009 are attached to the 
Complaint as Exhibit "B". 
7. When I was contacted by Brent L. Grigg to accept payment by an American Express 
credit card, I told Mr. Grigg I could not facilitate the transaction myself but the Bank of Commerce 
in Blackfoot could. I spoke with Justin Hokansen at the Bank of Commerce and he agreed to 
facilitate this transaction and when the funds were received from American Express they would be 
deposited in my checking account and Lesa Horrock's check would be returned to her. It was never 
discussed that the funds :from American Express would be given to Lesa Horrocks to cover the check 
rather the funds were to go to the Bank of Commerce and I would return the check to Lesa Horrocks. 
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8. It was Brent L. Grigg, Accelerated Paving, Inc. and/or Lesa D. Horrocks and 
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., who chose not to use the services of Bank of Commerce after 
I had left the meeting with Lesa Horrock's check. 
9. The reason I requested a post-dated check from someone other than Accelerated was 
that previous checks from Accelerated would not clear the bank. Lesa D. Horrocks knowingly 
agreed to write the check and by writing the check she assumed all risks associated therewith. 
10. Although the Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg states I was present when the card was ran 
that is incorrect. When I left the meeting Brent L. Grigg was to go to Blackfoot to the Bank of 
Commerce and run the American Express card. It was Brent L. Grigg and Lesa D. Horrocks who 
chose to do otherwise and I was not present and that was not our agreement. 
11. I never agreed that Accelerated would run the American Express card through 
Sunshine's credit card machine. The transaction was to have been done through the Bank of 
Commerce. 
12. Lesa D. Horrocks was present when Brent 1. Grigg informed her that the American 
Express credit card would be ran through the Bank of Commerce, that I was requesting a check to 
guarantee the funds in the event the funds did not go through and that once the funds were deposited 
in my account the check would be returned to Lesa D. Horrocks. Lesa D. Horrocks and Sunshine 
Secretarial Services, Inc. assumed all risk when writing the check and then knowingly changed the 
transaction by running the transaction through Sunshine's credit card machine rather than through 
the Bank of Commerce as previously agreed. 
13. Brent 1. Grigg notified me on or before January 14,2009, that the transaction did not 
go through and asked for additional time to work out an arrangement with American Express. I 
honored that request and it was not until January 26,2009, that I attempted to cash the check. 
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14. At no time was Alan Smith present during these negotiations. 
15. I disagree with the Affidavit of Lesa Horrocks in that when she was approached by 
Brent L. Grigg the transaction was to be run through the Bank of Commerce not through her credit 
card machine. It was not until after I left the meeting that Brent L. Grigg and Lesa Horrocks changed 
the terms of the transaction. 
16. The transaction was approved to go through the Bank of Commerce and Lesa D. 
Horrocks assumed all risk by allowing the transaction to be changed and run through Sunshine's 
credit card machine. 
17. At no time was the transaction to have been run through Sunshine's credit card 
machine but rather the credit card was to have been run through the Bank of Commerce and therefore 
no money would have been sent to Lesa D. Horrocks to cover the check but rather deposited in my 
account by the Bank of Commerce and the check returned to Lesa D. Horrocks. 
18. Lesa D. Horrocks assumed all liability when she wrote a check to Mickelsen 
Construction on behalf of Accelerated Paving. 
19. I disagree with the Affidavit of Alan Smith in that my bank declined to run the 
transaction. The Bank of Commerce agreed to facilitate the transaction and deposit the funds from 
American Express into my account. See Affidavit of Justin Hokanson filed herewith. 
20. The transaction which I agreed to did not involve the credit card being run through 
Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. but rather was to have been run through the Bank of Commerce. 
DATED this 1'1 day of January, 201 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I ~ day of January, 2011. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at Pocatello 
My commission expires: b -oL - J-0 l ( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 14~f January, 2011, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to: 
Aaron N. Thompson 
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered 
216 W Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[~S.mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 234-2961 
[~mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 236-7012 
G L.COOPER 
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Gary L. Cooper· tdlSho SEa.tSar #1814 
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P.O. Box 4229 
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Telephone: (208) 235·1145 
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IN THE DISTRTCT COURt OF THE SIXTH JUDiCIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE Of IDAHO, IN AND FOR. THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
:MICKELSBN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
Plaintif'r, 
VS. 
LESA DARLENE HORR.OCl{S and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC •• 
Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of 'Bingham ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CV·l01 0-027S7..QC 
AFFmAVITOF 
JUSTIN HOKANSON 
JUSTIN HOKANSON, being titstduLy sworn on oath, deposeA and states as follows: 
I .~ ... ....., 
I. 1 am the Senior Vice President of Bank of Commerce and. make this affidAvit of my 
own personal knowl£dic and info.tmation. 
2. I was contacted by Delwyn Mickelsen of Mickelsen Constructio~ Inc. md asked if 
an American Express credit ~ard could be run through the Bank of Commeroe and. the funds 
deposited into the account of Mickelsen Construction. Inc. 
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3. T infonncd Delwyn Mickelsen that the Bank. of Commerce would facilitate this 
tTansactioD. and. it was my understanding that a representative of Acgelera.ted Paving, !nc., would 
come to Blackfoot and run the transactioll. A representative of Accelerated Pavins. Inc. did not 
come to the bank and complete the ~on. 
DATED thi~ I flli day of J an:uary, 2011. 
~-ruSflN HOKANSON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I tt day of January, 2011. 
(SEAL) 
~~ T JY PUBLTC FOR-IDAHO 
Residing at Blackfoot 
My commission expires:t;3/bfIJ/ ~ I S-
CElITfFICAIE QI'SERVI'CE 
1 hereby oertify that all the 1~{ day of 1anuary, 2011~ I served a true and correct cop)' 
of the forcgoil'lg to! 
Aaron N. n10mpscm 
May~ .R.ammell & Thompson:. Chanered 
216 W Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pooatello,lO 83204-0370 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
Ditmet Judge 
B:mnock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatel1o~ ID 8320 I 
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U,S.mlll 
Express mail 
Hand deliv~ry 
Fax: 234 .. 2961 
U.S. mail 
Express mail 
Hand delivery 
Fax: 236·7012 
TOTAL P.003 
Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM AND 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and 
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson, 
Chartered, hereby submits this Reply Brief in response to Plaintiffs Memorandum. This matter 
is currently set for hearing on January 31,2011 before the Honorable Judge Dunn. 
I. ARGUMENT 
In the Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen, Mr. Mickelsen agrees that the only debt at issue 
was what Accelerated Paving owed Mickelsen Construction. There was a contract of some sort 
between Accelerated and Mickelsen. Prior to January, 2009, there is no allegation that 
SunshinelHorrocks owed any debt to Mickelsen. 
Mickelsen Construction threatened to file a Materialmen's Lien on a project completed 
at Accelerated Paving's request. Id. Therefore, initially, there was no privity between Mickelsen 
and SunshinelHorrocks. 
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-Alt-admit-ttlere was-a-conversation held between Mickelsen, Sunshine, and Accelerated 
in January, 2009. As a result, Accelerated agreed to pay Mickelsen by using its' business 
American Express credit card. Sunshine, acting as a facilitator, relying upon American Express 
to cover the check, ran the transaction and wrote a check to Mickelsen with the express 
understanding that American Express would immediately compensatee Sunshine for the 
transaction. 
Mickelsen states in its Complaint, in Paragraph VII, "Defendant Lesa D. Horrocks 
agreed to guarantee the credit card payment of Alan Smith and Acclerated Paying(sic), Inc., and 
to do so wrote a check .... ,,1 Therefore, by virtue of its' own pleadings, Mickelsen is alleging 
that this is an assumption/guarantee contract. Mickelsen, and Micklesen alone, carries the 
burden of proving the claims it alleges in its' pleadings. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
Mickelsen's Complaint is void of any other claims, including one for any other contractual 
relationship, absent the assumption/guarantee contract aforementioned. 
There was absolutely no writing that establishes Lesa Horrocks or Sunshine Secretarial 
Services, Inc. would assume this Acclerated debt. To avoid Summary Judgment, Mickelsen must 
come forward with some evidence that SunshinelHorrocks agreed to assume andlor guarantee 
this debt. Also, in order to prove this claim, Mickelsen must come forward with some evidence 
that a contract exists between Mickelsen and Sunshine/Horrocks. 
Mickelsen argues this assumption/guarantee contract does not fit within the Statute of 
Frauds for basically two reasons. One, Mickelsen asserts that it is an assumption contract, but the 
check is sufficient to fulfill the writing requirements. For the reasons stated in Defendants' 
Initial Brief, this is simply incorrect. Second, Mickelsen tries to sidestep the Statute of Frauds by 
using the I.e. § 9-506 statutory exceptions. These exceptions do not apply to this case. 
Assuming arguendo that this was an assumption/guarantee contract that does not require a 
writing, Mickelsen still carries the burden to prove a contract exists as to Mickelsen and 
SunshinelHorrocks. 
There is no contract here, regardless oUhe Statute of Frauds. Mickelsen cannot possibly 
succeed in a contract claim. Mickelsen goes to great measure in his Affidavit to state that he did 
not agree to anything regarding American Express, and that he believed that the transaction 
would occur through the Bank of Commerce. He avers that SunshinelHorrocks "assumed the 
1 Mickelsen Complaint. 
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---- ~~ - < - risk?-uywriting --tlrls--check. -This argumentmakesllvsense:-Why~would- SunslrirrefHOlTocks 
assume any risk at all in this relationship? This was not SunshinelHorrocks' debt. Mickelson 
would receive all of the benefit. This was a great deal for Mickelsen - but where exactly is the 
mutuality of obligation? What benefit did SunshineIHorrocks receive from Mickelsen, in any 
fashion, for writing this check? The Plaintiffs affidavits are absent of this evidence - primarily 
because there is none. 
In order for there to be a valid contract, between Mickelsen and SunshineIHorrocks, 
there must be an offer, acceptance, and consideration. There is no offer or acceptance here. 
There is absolutely no consideration. What exactly would SunshinelHorrocks gain by writing 
this check to Mickelsen? Mickelsen is really asserting that SunshinelHorrocks unilaterally 
assumed a debt, by which she had no obligation, paid Mickelsen a $35,000.00 check, just to join 
into the obligation "party". Lesa Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc. gained 
absolutely nothing by facilitating this transaction. There is absolutely no consideration, and 
frankly, there was no offer. SunshinelHorrocks was doing nothing but acting as an intermediate 
facilitator. 
This case must be examined in context. Mickelsen knows the true obligor of the 
underlying debt - Accelerated Paving. Mickelsen knows it cannot sue Accelerated Paving, 
because Accelerated has filed and discharged this debt via bankruptcy. Rather than chalking this 
up to a bad business decision, Mickelsen elects to sue SunshineIHorrocks. Mickelsen had no 
contract whatsoever with SunshinelHorrocks. 
Even if this transaction falls outside of the Statute of Frauds (which SunshinelHorrocks 
does not concede), it still fails, and dismissal is necessary. 
The check does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff seems to imply by writing a 
personal check, that this check is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. The check is not 
enough. There must be a sufficient memorandum to comply with the Statute of Frauds, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 9-505(2). For various policy reasons, the Idaho State Legislature requires a 
sufficient writing, note or memorandum that incorporates the understanding of the parties. 
If Mickelsen admits that there was no assumption contract, and agrees with that portion 
of the Horrocks' affidavit, it would be impossible for Mickelsen to prove there was an 
assumption/guarantee contract as asserted in his pleadings. 
Mickelsen misses the point in his attempted distinction of the Hoffman case. Hoffman v. 
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however, a Statute of Frauds case. It is also on point with regard to whether a personal check 
fulfills the Statue of Frauds requirements. The Hemingway court clearly states that a check 
doesn't satisfy the memorialization of an oral contract, defming specific terms. The check, in 
and of itself, is not a sufficient, "note or memorandum" to comply with the Statue of Frauds. 
The sale of real property requires a writing. So does a personal guarantee contract. It is not for 
this Court to decide why the legislature has required both to be in writing, but it certainly has 
defined a writing to be something more than a check. There has to be a memorandum or a 
sufficient writing, defining essential terms. 
The l. C. 9-506 are factually and legally inapplicable. Also, in an attempt to bypass the 
Statue of Frauds, Plaintiff cites Idaho Code § 9-506 and tries to "wiggle" the fact pattern to meet 
one of the conditions requiring that the Statute of Frauds need not apply. Each of these 
exceptions anticipate entirely different situations than what is presented. These exceptions, to the 
letter, simply do not apply to the fact pattern in this case. 
Even if, Plaintiff was successful in arguing that this is not an assumption contract that 
falls within the Statute of Frauds, it simply cannot meet the elements of a contract by failure of 
offer, acceptance and consideration. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment, regardless of 
the theory. 
DATED fuis2-~Y of January, 2011 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD 
Attorneys for De 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendants' Reply Brief to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum and Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment was served on the following 
named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED this ~ay of January, 2011 
~Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DIs~F.fiHErCl FPlc' -
- -- ...... 1 \i \ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register#CV -201 0-2757-0C 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
-------------------------------) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY mDGMENT 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant 
to I.R.c.P. Ru1e 56 ("Motion"). A hearing was held regarding the Motion on January 31,2011. 
After careful review of the arguments and record, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for 
the reasons stated herein. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.'" I.R.C.P.56(c); Arreguin v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 460, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008); Northwest Bee-Corp 
v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838,41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. Clanton, 
137 Idaho 492, 494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). When considering a motion for summary 
,i'''!''', 
judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor \ ~: 
0) <~.' 
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of the nonmoving party. Id. (citing S. Griffin Contr., Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 
185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). Normally, summary judgment_must be denied where reasonable 
persons could reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence 
presented. Id. 
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Northwest Bec-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. To meet this burden, the moving party 
must challenge, in its motion, and establish through evidence that no issue of material facts exists 
on an element of the nonmoving party's case. Id. The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial." Id. (quoting IRCP 56 (e)). Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the 
moving party, when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential 
to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). 
This standard is set out in a United States Supreme Court case which has been adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: 
The plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of Summary Judgment, after 
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, 
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at triaL In such a situation, there 
can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all 
other facts immaterial. The moving party is entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law ... 
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Cel/otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (see Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 
(1998)). Thus, a responding party cannot raise meritless defenses or claims to defeat Summary 
Judgment. Rather, a Defendant must introduce facts into the record that support each element of 
each defense or claim asserted. 
Summary judgment is mandated when a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
LR.C.P., Rule 56(a); Myers v. A.a. Smith Harvestor Products, Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 437 (Ct. 
App. 1988). That is, if there is no cognizable claim or defense, then no genuine issues of 
material fact are at issue and, as a matter of law, the motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
Even if the facts are not disputed, that does not always mean that summary judgment is 
proper. In Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028, 1030, 695 P.2d 413, 415 (CLApp. 1985), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals stated: 
[T]he Idaho Supreme Court has held that even though there are no genuine issues of 
material facts between the parties a motion for summary judgment must be denied, when 
the case is to be tried to a jury, if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be 
drawn therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions. Riverside 
Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
See also Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 326,411 P.2d 768, 770 (1966)("A motion for summary 
judgment must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn 
therefrom and if reasonable men might reach different conclusions.") Likewise, if the record 
raises questions concerning the credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence, a motion 
for summary judgment must be denied. Altman v. Arndt, 109 Idaho 218, 706 P.2d 107 (Ct.App. 
1985)(citing Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410,353 P.2d 657 (1960)). 
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Accelerated Paving, Inc. ("Accelerated") had a contractual relationship with Mickelsen, 
from which Accelerated owed Mickelsen $34,980.00 for services rendered by Mickelsen on a 
particular job site. When Accelerated did not pay, Mickelsen threatened to file a materialmen's 
lien against the real property to secure the funds. Alan Smith ("Smith"), Vice President of 
Accelerated, asked Mickelsen to not file the lien because it would prevent Accelerated from 
getting paid on the project. Delwyn testified that he would not accept payment by Accelerated's 
American Express credit card unless someone else would guarantee the payment. Delwyn 
asserts that Lesa D. Horrocks, partial owner of Sunshine Secretarial Services,2 agreed to 
guarantee the Accelerated credit card payment by writing a check from an account that lists 
Horrocks and Sunshine as the account holders. The check was in the amount $34, 980.00 and 
was dated January 8, 2009.3 
According to Delwyn, he told Brent L. Grigg ("Grigg"), general manager of Accelerated, 
that he could not facilitate a credit card transaction himself, but the Bank of Commerce in 
Blackfoot could. Delwyn states that he spoke with Justin Hokansen ("Hokansen") of the Bank of 
Commerce, and Hokansen agreed to facilitate the transaction and when the funds were received 
from American Express, they would be deposited into Mickelsen's checking account and 
Horrocks' check would be returned to her. Hokansen confirms that he informed Delwyn that the 
Bank of Commerce would facilitate the transaction, but states that a representative of 
Accelerated never came to the bank to complete the transaction.4 
1 The facts set forth below are taken from the affidavits filed by the parties and related witnesses, primarily the 
affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen ("Delwyn"). Specific references to the particular affidavits are not made unless 
deemed necessary by the Court, for emphasis. As set forth above, alLfacts..are construed in favor of the non-moving 
party, Mickelsen Construction, Inc. ("Mickelsen"). 
2 Defendants shall be collectively referred to as "Horrocks." 
3 A copy of the check is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A. It is made payable to Mickelsen Construction and 
the "For" line lists "Accel." 
4 Hokansen Aff. p. 2, ~ 3. 
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Delwyn alleges that in a meeting between himself, Grigg, and Horrocks, Grigg agreed to 
go to Blackfoot to the Bank of Commerce and run the American Express card. Then after 
Delwyn left the meeting, Delwyn states that Grigg and Horrocks decided to change the 
agreement and run the American Express card at Sunshine's office on Sunshine's credit card 
machine. Delwyn asserts that at no time did he ever agree to have the credit card transaction run 
at Sunshine's office. Delwyn claims that Horrocks kriowingly agreed to write the check to 
guarantee the funds in the event the credit card funds did not go through, and that once the funds 
were deposited in Delwyn's account, the check would be returned to Horrocks. 
Delwyn asserts that Grigg notified him on or before January 14,2009, that the credit card 
transaction did not go through and asked for additional time to work out an arrangement with 
American Express. Delwyn granted the request and it was not until January 26, 2009, that 
Delwyn attempted to cash the check. The check bounced and despite numerous demands by 
Delwyn, the checking account on which the check was written never had sufficient funds to 
cover the check. 5 Thus, Mickelsen never received payment from Accelerated, Horrocks, or 
Sunshine and has filed this case to recover against Horrocks and Sunshine.6 
Because it is relied on by Mickelsen, the Court notes Horrocks' assertion that, at 
Accelerated's request, she ran their American Express card through her machine with the 
understanding that once that credit card transaction was funded, Mickelsen would then cash her 
check in satisfaction of Accelerated's debt to Mickelsen. 
It is also noted that Horrocks, Grigg and Smith all agree that Horrocks received no 
benefit or consideration for her "facilitation" of Accelerated's attempt to pay its debt to 
Mickelsen. Mickelsen does not dispute this fact and it is accepted by the Court as undisputed. 
5 Copies of letters from the Idaho Central Credit Union, stating that the account has insufficient funds, dated January 
26,2009 and January 27, 2009, are attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B. 
6 Apparently, Accelerated as taken out bankruptcy and discharged its obligation to Mickelsen there. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Although generally a question of fact will preclude a summary judgment, the issue here is 
whether any alleged agreement of Horrocks to guarantee the Accelerated debt, is enforceable as 
a matter of law.7 Horrocks asserts, and Mickelsen agrees, that in the case of a special promise or 
guarantee to answer for the debt of another, there must be a writing sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, pursuant to I.C. § 9-505(2). The only writing referenced 
by either side is the check itself. Horrocks asserts that a written check does not satisfy the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 
Mickelsen argues that ifI.C. § 9-505(2) applies, then the check is a sufficient writing and 
satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
Secondarily, Mickelsen also claims, based on Horrocks affidavit, that no writing is 
required because Horrocks' actions of running Accelerated's credit card and providing a check to 
Mickelsen created and confirms an "original obligation," pursuant to I.C. § 9-506, which is an 
exception to the Statute of Frauds. The Court will first address the "original obligation" 
contention and then address whether the check is a sufficient writing under I.C. § 9-505(2). 
1. Does I.C.§ 9-506 apply? 
Mickelsen relies on subsections 1,2, and 3, ofIdaho Code § 9-506, which state: 
Original obligations - Writing not needed. - A promise to answer for the obligation of 
another, in any of the following cases, is deemed an original obligation of the promisor, 
and need not be in writing: 
1. Where the promise is made by one who has received property of another upon an 
undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received a discharge 
from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise. 
2. Where the creditor parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in consideration of the 
obligations in respect to which the promise is made, in terms or under circumstances such 
as to render the party making the promise the principal debtor, and the person in whose 
behalf it is made, his surety. 
7 The various affidavits, particularly of Delwyn and Horrocks, create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Horrocks guaranteed the Accelerated debt. If that was the only issue upon which the summary judgment motion 
was based, the motion would be denied. But, as noted above, that is not the primary issue raised by the motion. For 
purposes of this opinion, the Court accepts as true that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the Accelerated debt. 
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3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another, is made upon the 
consideration that the party receiving it cancels the antecedent obligation, accepting the 
new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the consideration that the party receiving it 
releases the property of another from a levy, or his person from imprisonment under an 
execution on a judgment obtained upon the antecedent obligation; or upon a 
consideration beneficial to the promisor, whether moving from either party to the 
antecedent obligation, or from another person. 
Mickelsen's argues that these subsections apply to the facts of this case as follows: 
1. I.C. § 9-506(1) applies because Defendants received the credit card transaction from 
Accelerated and promised to apply it to the debt owed to Mickelsen. 
2. I.C. § 9-506(2) applies because Mickelsen parted with value, namely agreed not to 
lien the project of Accelerated and Horrocks/Sunshine agreed to facilitate the 
transaction thereby making Horrocks/Sunshine the primary debtor. 
3. I.C. § 9-506(3) applies because Mickelsen released Accelerated from its right to lien 
the project and accepted Defendants' check.8 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Whether an oral promise constitutes a collateral or an original obligation, for the purposes 
of the statute of frauds, is generally a question for the fmder of fact. Dalby v. Kennedy, 94 
Idaho 72, 481 P.2d 30 (1971). See also Wright v. Wright, 97 Idaho 439, 546 P.2d 394 
(1976). The trial judge is the arbiter of whether the evidence indicating an original 
obligation is sufficient to allow the statute of frauds question to go to the jury. McQuade 
v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 46 Idaho 471, 268 P. 570 (1928). 
Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 614, 710 P.2d 520, 524 (1985). 
While no Idaho case is completely similar to this case, there are several Idaho cases that 
offer guidance in interpreting I.C. § 9-506. In Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. 
Earth Resources Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 373, 766 P.2d 1254 (Ct.App.1988), a construction 
subcontractor, Treasure Valley Plumbing and Heating, Inc. ("Treasure Valley"), brought an 
action to foreclose a mechanic's lien for work performed on a silver mine. The silver mine was 
predominantly owned by Earth Resources Company ("Earth Resources") and Treasure Valley 
was hired by the general contractor, Mountain States Mineral Enterprises, Inc. ("Mountain 
States"), to install necessary plumbing and a water supply system to the silver mine. Treasure 
Valley brought a lawsuit against Earth Resources and Mountain States claiming that it was 
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underpaid and that the owner, Earth Resources, had made assurances or a guarantee to pay at 
least some of Mountain States debts to Treasure Valley. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals found that Earth Resources' promise to pay for certain work 
was an original promise. In arriving at that conclusion, the court followed a legal doctrine called 
the "main purpose rule." The court states: 
Courts have resolved these disputes in different ways. The majority-and in our opinion 
the better-view applies the "main purpose" rule to this scenario. See RESTATEMENT 
OF SECURITY § 93 (1941). The main purpose rule provides that where the promisor 
(the owner) "has for his object a benefit which he did not enjoy before his promise, which 
benefit accrues immediately to himself, his promise is original, whether made before, 
after or at the time of the promise of the third party (the general contractor), 
notwithstanding that the effect is to promise to payor discharge the debt of another." 
Nelson v. Boynton, 44 Mass. 396 (1841) (quoted inGALAMARI AND PERILLO § 19-6 
at p. 685). In order for the rule to apply, there must be consideration for the owner's 
promise and the consideration must be beneficial to him. 
Id. 9 The court found that Earth Resources (the owner) made a pledge to pay Treasure Valley and 
that it received beneficial consideration for that guarantee. Accordingly, the court held that the 
agreement between Treasure Valley and Earth Resources was an original promise. 
In Reed v. Samuels, 43 Idaho 55,249 P. 893 (1926), an action was brought to recover 
money damages. Reed alleged that Samuels, a stockholder of a corporation, promised to pay the 
debt of the third party corporation to Reed in exchange for Reed agreeing to remit accrued 
interest on a sum of$9,000 and reduce his claim from $10,000 to $8,000. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that: 
Any promise to pay the debt of a third party, whether or not in writing, must be founded 
upon a consideration in order to be binding. McKenzie v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank, 9 
8 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p.5. 
9 See also 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 125 which states: 
Another test which may be employed to determine whether a promise is within the statute of frauds is 
whether the promisor becomes a guarantor or surety; in an attempt to tie such a test to the "collateral" and 
"original" promise framework, it has been said that a collateral undertaking to which the statute of frauds 
applies is one in which the promisor is merely a surety or guarantor, receives no direct benefit, and is liable 
only if the debtor defaults. [Emphasis added]. 
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Wash., 442,37 P. 668,43 Am. St. Rep. 844. There was no consideration moving to 
respondent. 
The rule is stated in Curtis v. Brown, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 488, 491, as follows: 
'It is not sufficient ground to prevent the operation of the statute of frauds that the 
plaintiff has relinquished an advantage; or given up a lien, in consequence of the 
defendant's promise, if that advantage has not also directly inured to the benefit of the 
defendant, so as in effect to make it a purchase by the defendant of the plaintiff. * * * The 
cases in which it has been held otherwise are those where the plaintiff, in consideration of 
the promise, has relinquished some lien, benefit, or advantage for securing or recovering 
his debt, and where by means of such relinquishment, the same interest or advantage has 
inured to the benefit of the defendant. ' 
43 Idaho at 57,249 P. at 895 (emphasis added by this Court). The court found that Samuels was 
merely acting as an agent of the corporation and that he received no direct benefit, "other than 
such as inured to the stockholders generally." Id Accordingly, Samuels' promise to pay the 
corporation's debt if Reed would reduce the claim, did not create an original obligation of the 
promisor within any of the exceptions of the Statute of Frauds. 
The analysis of these cases can be easily applied to the provisions ofLC. § 9-506: 
1. Where the promise is made by one [Horrocks] who has received property of another 
upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise; or by one who has received a 
discharge from an obligation in whole or in part, in consideration of such promise. 
2. Where the creditor [Mickelsen] parts with value, or enters into an obligation, in 
consideration of the obligations in respect to whichJtt~romise is made, in terms or 
under circumstances such as to render the party making the promise [Horrocks] the 
principal debtor, and the person in whose behalf it is made [Accelerated], his surety. 
3. Where the promise, being for an antecedent obligation of another [Accelerated], is 
made upon the consideration that the party receiving it [Mickelsen] cancels the 
antecedent obligation, accepting the new promise as a substitute therefor; or upon the 
consideration that the party receiving it releases the property of another from a levy, 
or his person from imprisonment under an execution on a judgment obtained upon the 
antecedent obligation; or upon a consideration beneficial to the promisor [Horrocks], 
whether moving from either party to the antecedent obligation, or from another person. 
In each of these exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, as noted in the appellate cases, the 
promise to pay the debt of another is valid only when the promisor, Horrocks in this case, 
receives property or a discharge of its own obligation (subsection 1); pursuant to terms and 
considerations which makes the promisor, Horrocks, the principle debtor, and the original debtor, 
Accelerated, a surety (subsection 2); or when there is a promise to pay an antecedent obligation, 
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Accelerated's debt, (which is the actual circumstance in this case), in exchange for beneficial 
consideration to the promisor, Horrocks. In short, Horrocks must substitute itself as the primary 
obligor in exchange for valid consideration and benefits, to have created an original obligation to 
pay the debt of another. In this case, even if Horrocks agreed to guarantee the credit card 
payment of Accelerated, Mickelsen has failed to show that Horrocks received any benefit by 
entering into this agreement. The only benefit Mickelsen notes in writing is an agreement to not 
file a lien against the property of another. 10 That is not a relinquishment of Accelerated's debt 
and does not benefit Horrocks at all. In fact, there is no suggestion here that any of the actions of 
the various parties was ever intended to relieve Accelerated as the primary obligor of the debt to 
Mickelsen. As noted in Reed, any agreement by Mickelsen to not file a lien is insufficient to 
prevent the operation of the Statute of Frauds if that agreement has not also directly bestowed a 
benefit upon Horrocks. The Court concludes that Horrocks' promise to guarantee the 
Accelerated debt does not create an original obligation, and I.e. § 9-506 does not apply so as to 
prevent the need for a sufficient writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
2. Is the check a sufficient writing under I.C. § 9-505(2)? 
Idaho Code § 9-505 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
§ 9-505. Certain agreements to be in writing- In the following cases the agreement is 
invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and 
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement 
cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents: 
2. A special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, except 
in the cases provided for in section 9-506, Idaho Code. 
In Idaho, I.C. § 9-505 is strictly construed. Kerr v. Finch, 25 Idaho 32,135 P. 1165 (1913); 
Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926). 
10 At oral argument, counsel for Mickelsen noted that the benefit to Horrocks was helping a party she had a business 
relationship with, as Horrocks affidavit shows that Accelerated subleased property occupied by Horrocks and paid 
rent for that sublease. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Horrocks agreed to guarantee the debt because 
of that relationship. 
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Mickelsen argues that the check written by Horrocks is a sufficient writing to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds, stating: "It is signed by Lesa Horrocks; it is made payable to Mickelson [sic] 
Construction; is for $34,980; and identifies that it is 'For Accel.' which is sufficient to identify 
Accelerated Paving."l1 Mickelsen asserts that because the statute simply requires "some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged," the check meets the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
Horrocks asserts that the check alone is insufficient, citing Hemingway v. Gruner, 106 
Idaho 422,679 P.2d 1140 (1984), where the Idaho Supreme Court, in a case involving an alleged 
oral agreement to purchase real estate, found that a $7,500 check lacked essential elements and 
was "insufficient to take the transaction out of the operation of the statute of frauds." 1 06 Idaho 
at 425,679 P.2d at 1143. Horrocks also cites Hoffman v. Sv. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 
218 (1981), which was relied on in Hemingway, where the court held that a $5,000 check, 
standing alone, was insufficient to satisfy the statute of fraudsJn a purchase of real estate case. 
102 Idaho at 190, 628 P .2d at 221. 
Mickelsen argues that Horrocks' reliance on Hoffman (and by reference the argument 
would also apply to Hemingway) is misplaced, asserting that Hoffman is different from the case 
at hand because Hoffman dealt with the purchase and sale of real property with numerous 
component parts, and the only notation on the check was the phrase, "Escrow Ruud Mtn. Lots." 
As noted above, Mickelsen's position is that this case deals with a simple guaranty and that the 
check contains enough information to be a sufficient note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute 
of Frauds. 
The Court disagrees. In a case not involving the purchase of real estate, but involving an 
alleged guarantee, the Idaho Court of Appeals has found that a check did not rise to the level of a 
II Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. 
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written guaranty. In Gulf Chemical Employees Federal Credit Union v. Williams, 107 Idaho 
890,693 P.2d 1092 (Ct.App.1984),12 a lender was unable to perfect its security interest in an 
automobile because it never received a document of title to the car. The lender brought an action 
against both the buyer and seller of the car to determine whether an obligation recited upon the 
back of a check issued by the lender to the buyer and seller as copayees was binding on both 
payees. The check contained the following language: 
This check represents the proceeds of a loan. You are obligated to furnish a negotiable 
title to the vehicle or mobile home: Description 1979 AMC Jeep LD. $ J8F83EH132729 
within thirty days after endorsement of this check. Failure to furnish a negotiable title 
will constitute liability for any expense required to procure. 
107 Idaho at 892, 693 P.2d at 1094. 
As to the obligations of the seller, the court held: 
The question, then, is narrowed to the application of contract law to undisputed facts. It 
long has been settled that no enforceable contract exists unless it reflects a meeting of the 
minds and embodies a distinct understanding common to both parties. E.g., Phelps v. 
Good, 15 Idaho 76, 96 P. 216 (1908). The contract must be specific enough to show that 
the parties shared a mutual intent. Barnes v. Huck, 97 Idaho 173,540 P.2d 1352 (1975). 
In general, a contract also must create a mutuality of obligation. Green v. Beaver State 
Contractors, Inc., 93 Idaho 741, 472 P.2d 307 (1970). 
The district court ruled, and we agree, that the requisites for an enforceable contract have 
not been established in this case. The language imprinted on the check fails to specify 
what obligation, if any, is imposed on the seller. It recites only that "[y]ou are obligated 
to furnish negotiable title to the vehicle .... " It does not identify the party addressed by the 
term "you" and it does not state to whom the title must be delivered. This vague 
language, unaccompanied by any other communication between the lender and seller, 
fails to show a meeting of the minds or a distinct understanding common to both parties. 
We cannot discern any mutual intent shared by the seHer and the lender. Neither does the 
imprinted language provide a mutuality of obligation. The lender undertook nothing, and 
did nothing, specifically for the seller. The lender simply disbursed a loan pursuant to an 
existing agreement with the borrower. 
Of course, the lack of separate consideration for the seller would not be fatal if the 
imprinted language created an otherwise valid guaranty agreement. In such an agreement 
the extension of credit to a debtor is deemed sufficient consideration for the guarantor. 
Bank a/Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 647 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1982). But the language 
12 Also, in Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 612, 836 P.2d 558 (Ct.App. 1992), the court found that, "The check by itself 
does not create a contract." 122 Idaho at 622,836 P.2d at 568. 
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on the check in this case does not rise to the level of a guaranty agreement. Although no 
particular wording is necessary to create a guaranty, it must satisfy the fundamental 
requisites of mutual understanding and definiteness applicable to any contract. See cases 
cited in 38 AMJUR.2d Guaranty §§ 5,26, 37 (1968). Moreover, our Supreme Court has 
declared that even where valid guaranty agreements exist, they must be strictly construed 
and not extended beyond the express limits of the instruments creating them. Industrial 
Investment Corp. v. Rocca, 100 Idaho 228,596 P.2d 100 (1979). A fortiori, no guaranty 
agreement can be created by the express terms of an instrument that falls short of 
establishing the requisites of a valid contract. 
107 Idaho at 893-94, 693 P .2d at 1 095-96 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the Court concludes, consistent with Gulf Chemical, that the check alone 
fails to show a meeting of the minds or show that the parties shared a mutual intent. The check 
in Gulf Chemical was far more specific than what is present here, but it was still insufficient. 
The check in this case fails to specify the terms of the obligation by each party. In this case, as 
in Gulf Chemical, "[t]he [Plaintiff] undertook nothing, and did nothing, specifically for the 
[Defendants]." Id As stated in Hoffman, and confirmed in Gulf Chemical: "[N]o guaranty 
agreement can be created by the express terms of an instrument that falls short of establishing the 
requisites of a valid contract." Id "[A] memorandum must plainly set forth the parties to the 
contract, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property and 
all the essential terms and conditions of the agreement." Hoffman, 102 Idaho at 190,628 P.2d at 
221 (emphasis added).l3 All the check issued by Hoffman does in this case is identify some type 
13 See also Restatement of Contracts § 207, which states: 
A memorandum, in order to make enforceable a contract within the Statute, may be any document or 
writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to be charged or by his agent actually or apparently 
authorized thereunto, which states with reasonable certainty, 
(a) each party to the contract either by his own name, or by such a description as will serve to identifY him, 
or by the name or description of his agent, and 
(b) the land, goods or other subject-matter to which the contract relates, and 
(c) the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom and to whom the 
promises are made. 
See also 38 Am. Jur. 2d, Guaranty, § 5: "For an instrument to be enforceable as a guaranty, it must show, with 
reasonable clarity, an intent to be liable on an obligation in case of a default by the primary obligor, and the 
agreement must contain the express conditions of that liability and the obligations of each party within the four 
comers of the document. That undertaking must be clear and explicit." 
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of payment from Hoffman to Mickelsen, without clearly and explicitly setting forth that it is a 
guarantee and what the terms and conditions of that guarantee are. Delwyn'S affidavit fills in the 
blanks, as it were, from Mickelsen's perspective, but those assertions cannot be considered if the 
writing upon which they are based is insufficient. The check lacks essential elements of a 
guarantee contract. Therefore, the Court finds that the check, standing alone, is insufficient to 
satisfy the requirements ofLC. § 9-505. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Horrocks' alleged 
promise to guarantee the Accelerated debt does not create an original obligation, and I.C. § 9-506 
does not apply to this case. In addition, the check is an insufficient writing to satisfy the 
requirements ofl.C. § 9-505. Even if Horrocks did promise to guarantee the Accelerated debt, 
which is factually disputed but accepted as true for purposes of this motion, that promise is 
unenforceable, as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Summary Judgment to the 
Defendants on all issues and claims in this case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this M day of.r-e6YKM1i ,2011. 
~Mr= 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day of 0rb ,2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Aaron Thompson 
MA Y, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
(1 ~ ,-DATED this _ day OfL jeA.,) ,2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register#CV-20IO-2757-0C 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, 
INC., 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
------------------------------) 
JUDGMENT 
PN i: 2 J 
Pursuant to .aMemorandum Decision and Order dated the 2nd day of February, 2011, this 
- .' 
Court GRANTED the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants, Lesa Darlene Horrocks 
and Supshine Secretarial Services, Inc. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and by reason of the premises aforesaid, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered 
in this matter in favor of said Defendants and against the Plaintiff, Mickelsen Construction, Inc., and 
this case is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED this :;.d day of f;./).y~ ,2011. 
 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L day 0[' ... 3(1::::> ,2011, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Aaron Thompson 
MA Y, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370 
DATED this t day of <. 1ch ,2011. 
(iu.s. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
({u.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
Deputy c'fJ ~"" 
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Aaron N. Thompson, Esq. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHARTERED 
216 West Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Facsimile: (208) 234-2961 
Idaho State Bar No. 6235 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
DEFENDANT HORROCKS AND 
SUNSlDNE SECRETARIAL'S 
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
Defendants Lesa Daralene Horrocks and Sunshine Secretarial Services, Inc., by and 
through their counsel of record, Aaron N. Thompson of the fIrm May, Rarnmell & Thompson, 
Chartered respectfully submits this Memorandum Of Attorneys Fees And Costs. This 
Memorandum is supported by the Affidavit Of Aaron N. Thompson Re: Attorneys Fees And Costs 
and the Court record and file in this case. 
BRIEF PROCEDURAL mSTORY 
Plaintiff Mickelsen Construction, Inc. sued Defendants Sunshine Secretarial Services, 
Inc. and Lesa Darlene Horrocks for breach of a guarantee contract, and alleged attorney's fees 
and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-120. Defendants filed and answer, and correspondingly, 
requested attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the same section. Summary Judgment was 
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granted in favor of Defendants on February 2, 2011, and all of Plaintiff s claims were dismissed 
as a result of that Judgment. 
HORROCKS AND SUNSHINE HAVE APPROPRIATELY REQUESTED FEES 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-120. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an award of reasonable attorney's fees in commercial 
transactions. While Horrocks/Sunshine believe it is reasonably clear that this case involves a 
"commercial transaction" as defined by Idaho Code § 12-120(3). This alleged transaction was 
between two corporations, and was certainly not a transaction for household purposes. The 
nature of these proceedings and their governance by Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and thus 
SunshineIHorrocks has clearly established that it/she has a basis for requesting fees in this case. 
The legislature'S policy of awarding fees to a personin Horrocks/Sunshine's position is 
clear. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is a deviation from the "American Rule" in which each side is 
responsible for their own fees and costs. See e.g. Heller v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578 (Idaho 
1984). In response to Idaho Courts limiting attorney's fees in commercial transactions, the 
statute was amended in 1986, broadening the definition of "commercial transaction". As stated in 
Myers v. Verrmaas, 114 Idaho 85, 87 (Ct. App. 1998), "the automatic nature of an award under 
I.C. § 12-120 makes it, in effect, an adjunct to the underlining commercial agreement between 
the parties. It establishes an entitlement." [emphasis added]. The policy of making non-
breaching parties "whole", and encouraging swift resolution of cases, so that lawsuits are 
unnecessary is apparent. 
Horrocks/Sunshine surely has a right to rely on a law specifically enacted to protect 
people in itlher position, so that she does not have to exhaust her money enforcing a business 
contract. 
HORROCKS/SUNSIDNE IS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND IS ENTITLED FEES 
AND COSTS 
The bottom line is that Defendant prevailed on all essential elements of defending this 
claim. Plaintiff asserted commercial contract claims against Defendant. The Court dismissed 
that claim as a matter of law. Defendants are the prevailing parties. 
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GIDDELINES 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1)(b), in conjunction with LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) provides the guidelines for a 
court's determination of who is a prevailing party and how reasonable attorney's fees are 
determined. The determination of whether a party is a prevailing party is a matter of discretion. 
Zenner v. Holcomb, 09.13 ISCRI (June 2009). 
HORROCKlSUNSIllNE'S FEES ARE REASONABLE 
Rule 1 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure calls for the rules to be applied so that 
justice is served. Defendants were sued by Plaintiff, and the fees incurred were reasonable and 
within the context of what she had to do to protect herself. The matter was handled in an 
expeditious fashion. Minimal discovery was done. The matter was called for Summary 
Judgment early in the proceedings, and well before any dispositive motion deadlines. 
As explained in Meldco Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills Inc., 118 Idaho 265 (Ct. App. 1990) 
the amount of attorney's fees awarded should be determined by the application of the I.R.C.P. 
54( e )(3) factors. 
TIME AND LABOR REQIDRED 
Per Zenner, Horrocks/ Sunshine's time and labor is a factor. As previously stated, 
Defendants kept discovery to a minimum, and invested maximum effort towards resolving the 
legal issues via Summary Judgment. There was no undue delay associated with the case, nor 
were there prolonged motions, etc. The time and labor required to bring this matter to fruition is 
certainly reasonable given the circumstances. 
THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE QUESTIONS 
This case did not involve a complex set of facts, but did present significant difficulty 
from a research and drafting perspective. As was argued at Summary Judgment, there was 
complexity involving whether this contract was subject to the Statute of Frauds. There was not 
case law directly on point. This was a factor in the case. 
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SKILLS REQUISITE TO PERFORM THE LEGAL SERVICE AND THE EXPERIENCE 
AND ABILITY OF THE ATTORNEY IN THE PARTICULAR FIELD OF LAW 
Mr. Thompson has nearly 11 years of legal experience. As stated, the facts were not 
particularl y complicated in this case, but the legal issues were. Opposing counsel is an 
extremely skilled, respected and experienced trial attorney. This required counsel to be sharp to 
achieve his client's desired result. 
THE PREVAILING CHARGES FOR LIKE WORK 
Based on 10 112 years of experience, the fees charged are similar to or less to others who 
perform similar work with similar experience in this area. 
WHETHER THE FEE IS FIXED OR CONTINGENT 
The fee in this case is hourly. Horrocks/Sunshine will be forced to absorb the fees and 
costs which Horrocks/Sunshine was required to incur in order to defend this case. 
THE TIME LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY THE CLIENT OR BY THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 
Not a factor in this case. 
THE AMOUNT INVOLVED AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED 
As in Zenner, the amount involved may have been relatively minor. The justiciable issue 
was a $35,000 commercial transaction. Horrocks/Sunshine could have been exposed to a 
judgment that a small business is not capable of incurring and survive. 
THE UNDESIRABILITY OF THE CASE 
Given that the opposing party had able counsel, it was undesirable. This case created 
quite a headache for the Defendants. This caused considerable fear for SunshinelHorrocks, a 
very small business. Counsel did not take a huge retainer in this case due to a hope that 
Summary Judgment would be granted. Had the Summary Judgment failed, SunshinelHorrocks 
would have been placed in the difficult situation of coming up with additional funds to finance 
this litigating. 
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THE NATURE AND LENGTH OF THE PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSmp WITH THE 
CLIENT 
The fees requested are not substantial. Horrocks/Sunshine have not been long-term 
clients of May, Rammell, and Thompson, but for the limited purpose of handling this case. 
AWARDS IN SIMILAR CASES 
The Zenner case, supra, illustrates a correlation between small awards and large 
attorney's fees. Defendant receives no judgment for successfully defending this suit. The only 
thing that Defendants have gained by this case is an attorney's fee bill. 
THE REASONABLE COST OF AUTOMATED LEGAL RESEARCH 
This factor is included in the time spent researching cases and preparing the case. 
ANY OTHER FACTOR wmCH THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE OF A 
PARTICULAR CASE 
A. A failure to award fees rewards Mickelsen. 
Mickelsen knew the proper party here was Accelerated Paving. Horrocks was nothing 
more than a facilitator of a transaction. For Mickelsen to escape being charged with fees, he 
escapes with little to no responsibility for bringing this claim. Horrocks/Sunshine must be made 
whole by the Court for this haphazardness, consistent with the policies established by I.C. 12-
120 and the supporting Idaho case law. 
DATED this L6- day of February, 2011. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD 
~ 
CASE NO. 2010-2757-0C - DEFENDANT HORROCKS AND SUNSIflNE SECRETARIAL'S 
MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS - PAGE 5 
80 
c: 
\,,) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Defendant Horrocks and Sunshine 
Secretarial's Memorandum Of Fees And Costs was served on the following named persons at the 
addresses shown an in the matter indicated. 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED this (b day of February, 2011. 
[ il7.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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s· 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar #1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
) 
DefendantslRespondents. ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category/Amount: (1)($101) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS, LESA DARLENE HORROCKS 
AND SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, INC. AND THEIR ATTORNEY, AARON 
N. THOMPSON, P. O. BOX 370, POCATELLO, ID 83204; AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Plaintiff! Appellant, Mickelsen Construction, Inc., appeals against 
the above named Defendants/Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum 
Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 2, 2011, and Judgment dated 
February 2,2011, which rulings were entered in the above entitled action on the dates stated above 
by the Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -PAGE 1 
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2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1 ) 
and/or II(a)(7), 1.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends to 
assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal, including the following: 
A. The Court improperly applied the law contained in 1. C. §§9-505 and 9-506. 
B. The Court improperly concluded that a check is an insufficient note or 
memorandum of an agreement to guarantee a debt. 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO. 
5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES. 
(b) The Appellant requests preparation ofthe following portions of the reporter's 
transcript: 
January 31,2011 Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 1.A.R.: 
-.----~ 
A. 10-29-2010 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 
Rule 56 
B. 10-29-2010 Affidavit of Lesa Darlene Horrocks in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
C. 10-29-2010 Affidavit of Alan Smith in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
D. 10-29-2010 Affidavit of Brent L. Grigg in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
E. 10-29-2010 Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. Rule 56 
F. 01-14-2011 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
G. 01-14-2011 Affidavit of Delwyn Mickelsen 
H. 01-14-2011 Affidavit of Justin Hokanson 
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I. 
J. 
K. 
01-24-2011 
02-02-2011 
02-02-2011 
Defendants' Reply Briefto Plaintiffs Memorandum and Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment 
Judgment 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of 
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Sheila Fish, Court Reporter 
c/o District Court Clerk 
624 E Center, Room 218 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
(b)( 1) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(c)( 1) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid. 
(d)(l) That the Appellant's filing fee has been paid. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this <~ay of March, 2011. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3 
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.I 
/GARYL. COOPER 
/ 
l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ay of March, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Aaron N. Thompson 
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered 
216 W Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -PAGE4 85 
[ ~.S.mail 
[] Express mail 
[ ] -- Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 234-2961 
[~.mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 236-7012 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
) 
Defendants ) 
) 
CASE NO. CV-2010-02757-0C 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM FOR ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW Mickelsen Construction, Inc., by and through its attorney of record Gary L. 
Cooper and submits the following: 
1. Mickelsen Construction, Inc. submits that I. C. § 12-120(3) governs the award of attorney 
fees in this case because this was an action on a guaranty. 
2. Because counsel for Plaintiff had both a paralegal and an associate available to work on 
this case, counsel should not have charged for proof reading motions and affidavits. Plaintiff objects 
to the proofreading charges totaling $869.50 as identified on the highlighted copy of the bill attached 
as Exhibit "A" to this objection. 
~w 
."CS OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUMltPR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS - PAGE I 
3. The charge for copies/fax costs totaling $36.70 is not a cost as a matter of right and is not 
a discretionary cost which can be awarded in this case. Therefore, the expenses totaling $36.70 
should be stricken. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of March, 2011, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Aaron N. Thompson 
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chartered 
216 W Whitman 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello,ID 83204-0370 
Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
District Judge 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Room 220 
Pocatello,ID 83201 
[/ u.S. mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery 
[] Fax: 234-2961 
[~.mail 
[] Express mail 
[] Hand delivery [1 Fax: 236-7012 
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Date: 02/11/2011 
Trans 
Date 
Fees 
09/3012010 
09/3012010 
09/3012010 
1010212010 
10105/2010 
10105/2010 
10/12/2010 
10/13/2010 
10/14/2010 
10/15/2010 
10/15/2010 
10/15/2010 
10/18/2010 
10/18/2010 
10/19/2010 
10/2012010 
10120/2010 
10/2012010 
10/20/2010 
10122/2010 
10/2212010 
10125/2010 
10/25/2010 
10/26/2010 
10128/2010 
10128/2010 
10128/2010 
10128/2010 
10/29/2010 
10129/2010 
10129/2010 
10129/2010 
11/12/2010 
11/15/2010 
11/1712010 
11/18/2010 
Atty 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
12 
12 
6 
6 
6 
6 
Rate 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00. 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
100.00 
100.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
185.00 
Detail Transaction File List 
.t1ay, Rammell & Thompson, Charter 
Page: 1 
Hours 
to Bill 
0.50 
,0.50 
0.50 
0.10 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
0.20 
1.00 
0.50 
0.30 
2.00 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
0.50 
0.50 
0.10 
0.50 
0.10 
0.30 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
0.50 
0.20 
0.50 
0.30 
0.10 
0.20 
88 
Amount 
35.00 Conference with Client. Billed @ $35.00 
92.50 Review Complaint and Documents. 
92.50 Review Statute of Frauds. 
18.50 Telephone Call: Penrod. 
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re: 
Discovery. 
92.50 Review Discovery Response. 
37.00 Review Documents from Opposing 
Attorney. 
Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re: 
Discovery. 
185.00 Draft Motion for Summary Judgment. 
92.50 Draft Affidavit. 
55.50 Draft Motion. 
370.0Q-Draft Affidavit. 
37.00 Review Affidavit. 
92.50 Proofread Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
37.00 Proofread Affidavit. 
. 92.50 Proofread Affidavit of Grigg. 
92.50 Proofread Affidavit of Smith. 
18.50 E-mail to client.. 
92.50 Proofread memo for Summary 
Judgment. 
18.50 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re: 
Affidavit. 
55.50 Proofread Memo. 
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
37.00 Proofread Grigg Affidavit. 
37.00 Review Documents. 
Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
37.00 E-mail to client.. 
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
92.50 Proofread Memo for Summary 
Judgment. 
37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re: 
Summary Judgment. 
92.50 Proofread Affidavit and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
37.00 Letter to Opposing Attorney. 
50.00 Review and correct Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
20.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
Conference with Aaron. 
92.50 Prepare for Hearing. 
55.50 Attend Hearing. 
18.50 Instructions to Legal Assistant. 
37.00 E-mail to client.. 
Friday 02111/2011 4:06 pm 
Date: 02/11/2011 Detail Transaction File list Page: 2 
, Rammell & Thompson, Ch 
Trans Hours 
Date Atty Rate to Bill Amount 
Fees 
11/22/2010 6 185.00 0.10 18.50 E-mail to client.. 
11/24/2010 6 185.00 0.30 55.50 Strategy. 
12/01/2010 6 185.00 0.30 55.50 E-mail to and from client.. 
12/0212010 10 75.00 0.20 15.00 Draft Notice of Hearing. 
12/0212010 6 185.00 0.20 37.00 Instructions to Legal Assistant. Re: 
Notice. 
01/18/2011 6 185.00 0.50 92.50 Review Summary Judgment Memo. 
Letter to client. 
01/19/2011 6 185.00 0.20 37.00 Review Affidavit of Justin H. 
Letter to client. 
01/20/2011 6 185.00 1.00 185.00 Draft Reply Memo. 
01/20/2011 6 185.00 1.00 185.00 Work on Summary Judgment. 
01/21/2011 6 185.00 0.50 92.50 Proofread Memo. 
01/24/2011 6 185.00 0.50 92.50 Proofread reply brief. 
01/31/2011 6 185.00 1.00 185.00 Prepare for Hearing. 
01/31/2011 6 185.00 0.50 92.50 Prepare for Hearing. 
Attend Hearing. 
02/03/2011 6 185.00 0.50 92.50 Review Order. 
Letter to client. 
02/04/2011 6 185.00 0.20 37.00 Telephone Call to Client. 
Expenses 
10/15/2010 6 1.000 3.00 FAX 
10/27/2010 6 1.000 4.00 FAX 
10/29/2010 6 0.150 17.55 Copy expense 
10/29/2010 6 1.000 6.00 FAX 
12/31/2010 6 0.150 1.50 Copy expense 
01/31/2011 6 0.150 4.65 Copy expense 
Billable 20.60 3,708.70 
Friday 0211112011 4:06 pm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Plaintiff, CASE NO: CV-2010-2757-0C 
vs. JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
Defendant. 
This matter came for hearing based on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Aaron N. Thompson of the firm May, Rammell & Thompson 
Chartered, was present for Defendants, and Javier L. Gabiola of Cooper & Larsen Law Office 
was present for the Plaintiffs. Argument was held on May 2, 2011, at approximately 2:00 p.m. 
At the onset of the hearing, Plaintiff conceded that Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applied, and 
therefore, Defendants were entitled to attorney's fees as a matter of right. The Court found that 
the costs requested in the Motion were usual and customary, but not extraordinary, and therefore 
omitted. The Court deemed, in its discretion, that the fees objected to in Plaintiff s Objection 
were excludable. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, and Decreed: 
1. That Defendants shall have a Judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $2,802.50 
as of May 2, 2011; 
2. That said Judgment will carry the legal rate of interest of 5.375%, simple interest, per 
annum until recovered. 
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DATED this ~OfMay,2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this date a copy of the foregoing Judgment for Attorney' s Fees was 
served on the following named persons at the addresses shown and in the manner indicated. 
Aaron N. Thompson [11" u.s. Mail 
May, Rarnmell & Thompson, Chtd [] Facsimile 
P.O. Box 370 [ ] Hand Delivery 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Gary L. Cooper 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
DATED this ~day of May, 2011 
[ (u.s. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTIONS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES, 
INC. , 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) 
. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 
38634-2011 
Bannock County 
Court No. 
2010-2757 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Bannock, Stephen S. 
District Judge, presiding. 
Dunn, 
LODGED at the B~nnock County 
Courthouse in Pocatello, 
Idaho, this ~ day of 
~ ,2011, at 
0' clock .m. 
----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUCTION, INC. ) 
) Supreme Court No. 38534-2011 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and ) 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES ) 
INC., ) 
Defendants-Respondents, ) 
-------------------------) 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock,do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this ""'--__ '- day of , 2011. 
(Seal) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
DALE HATCH, _~~~_~~ 
/?~~~Cferk of the District c;Ourt c:::::~~, 
(, Bannocf<Couflt¥,~-lga 0 Supreme Court 
" ,,', '~:t·'=~-:~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICf OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK 
MICKELSEN CONSTRUmON, INC. 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
LESA DARLENE HORROCKS and 
SUNSHINE SECRETARIAL SERVICES 
INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents, ) 
-------------------------) 
Supreme Court No. 38534-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I 
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of 
Record in this cause as follows: 
Gary L. Cooper 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
Post Office Box 4229 
Pocatello, Id 83205-4229 
Aaron N. Thompson 
May, RammeU~& Thompson, Chartered 
Post Office Box 370 
Pocatello, Id 83204-0370 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this-=-= , 2011. 
(Seal) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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